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I. INTRODUCTION 1
At 8:50 in the morning on July 7, in a subway car packed with
morning commuters on their way to work in a major metropolitan city, a
suicide bomber detonates the explosives concealed in his backpack.
Across town on another subway car, commuters observe a young man
fiddling with his backpack seconds before it explodes, ripping the car to
shreds. An instant later, a third explosion rocks yet another subway
train, stranding maimed and panicked passengers in between stations.
Within two minutes, nearly forty people taking the morning trip to work
have been killed and another 600 have been injured.
The subway system plunges into darkness and chaos, as the
panicked survivors and wounded flee the scenes of the devastation.
Emergency personnel receive reports of a disruption to the subway
system caused by power surges or train derailments and evacuate nearly
a quarter of a million passengers from the subway. Medical personnel on
scene begin to tend to the wounded.
Many of those evacuated, unaware of what has caused the subway
system to shut down, cram onto already packed buses to complete their
morning commute. At 9:45 a.m., nearly an hour after the first
1. The narrative presented in the Introduction was largely developed from the
BBC's detailed timeline of the July 7, 2005 attacks in London. BBC, Timeline of the 7




detonations, a fourth individual sets off a bomb on one of the crowded
buses, killing himself and thirteen others, and wounding another 110
passengers and pedestrians near the bus.
About two hours after the last explosion, government officials begin
to report the event as a terrorist attack. Shortly thereafter, a message
appears on an al-Qaeda-linked website claiming responsibility for the
events.
The city is not London-instead, it is New York, and the year is
2011. The events plunge America back into the all-too familiar feelings
of confusion, fear, and desolation that reigned in the weeks and months
after the attacks on September 11, 2001. The merciless assault on
innocent commuters reminds the nation that we remain potential targets
for terrorist assault, even as we move through the most routine activities
of our daily lives. Moreover, the events suggest to many citizens that the
actions to protect the country, taken by the government subsequent to the
attacks of 2001, have failed.
Within the weeks that follow, investigators report that the bombers
have been identified as American citizens, young men converted to a
radical version of Islam. Public attention, directed by the media, turns to
the predominantly Muslim communities in which these young men were
raised to determine the source of their radical inclinations. Newspaper
columnists and talk radio hosts begin to raise questions about the
teaching of radical, fundamentalist preachers within some of these
communities-preachers whose speeches may have made converts of the
2four young bombers. Some commentators begin to proselytize to
listeners about the need to shut these preachers of hate and violence
down.3
Confronted with the renewed threat of terror, this time largely
arising from domestic sources, how would the United States respond to
demand for action from citizens, politicians, and talking heads on the
airwaves? If we discovered radical preachers within our own nation,
2. Cf, e.g., Muslim Converts: Islam's Makeover, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2006, at 17
(noting the response of some commentators to the report that three of the twenty-five
plotters involved in a thwarted terrorist attack in the United Kingdom were converts to
Islam); Mark Palmer, The Deadly Peril of Allowing Muslim Ghettos to Flourish, THE
ExPREss, Sept. 22, 2006, at 12 (discussing British Home Secretary John Reid's 2006
speech in Leyton, East London in which Reid argued that religious fanatics were
brainwashing the children of residents and grooming them to commit terrorist acts);
Terrorism and Civil Liberties: Watch Your Mouth, EcONOMIST, Aug. 13, 2005, at 20
(describing the classic narrative of converts to radical Islam).
3. Cf, e.g., Tony Parsons, Speechless at Oafs Vile Rant, THE MIRROR, Sept. 25,
2006, at 25 ("How long do we have to listen to nutcases praising terrorists and
threatening our destruction?").
2009]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
individuals who preached a violent, twisted version of Islam4 that
arguably led young Americans to strap explosives to their backs and to
murder their fellow citizens, would the government act to silence such
speech? Could the government constitutionally do so?
The British government responded to the July 7, 2005 attacks with a
number of measures designed to curb the threat posed by terrorism.
5
Among the measures the British Parliament passed was the Terrorism
Act 2006,6 which includes a provision specifically aimed at radical
leaders whose language may incite others to commit acts of terrorism.7
Specifically, the new law penalizes those whose speech glorifies
terrorists or celebrates their acts.8 Naturally, a law of this nature has
raised serious concerns about restrictions on the freedom of speech.9
Freedom of speech in the United States is safeguarded by the First
Amendment to the Constitution1 ° and has long been recognized as one of
our most important freedoms. 1" Justices of the Supreme Court have
4. It should be noted at this point, that I do not intend to single out Islam or its
faithful as a religion inherently enmeshed with the principles and threat of terrorism. In
fact, the threat posed by the violent religious fundamentalists of the future might easily
come from any religious sect-one could easily substitute "televangelist" for "imam" in
the hypothetical presented in this Comment. However, at the present time, public
demands for government response to advocacy calling on listeners to commit acts of
terror, at least in Britain, focus overwhelmingly on radical preachers at the outermost
fringe of fundamentalist Islam. See, e.g., Roya Nikkhah & Adam Lusher, Police Accused
of "Cowardly Failure" to Prosecute Militant, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept.
24, 2006, at 2.
5. See Kenneth Lasson, Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the Limits of Free
Speech and Religious Liberty, 27 WHITTIER L. REv. 3, 25-26 (2005); Martha Minow,
Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 453, 480-81 (2007); Terrorism
and Civil Liberties: Watch Your Mouth, supra note 2.
6. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pts. 1-3 (Eng.).
7. See Souad Mekhennet & Dexter Filkins, Violent Remarks: British Law Against
Glorifying Terrorism Has Not Silenced Calls to Kill for Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2006, § A, at 8 ("The law's underlying assumption is that speeches and publications by
Britain's more extreme Islamists may play a role in leading disgruntled young men
toward violence."); see also Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n. 1I
(Eng.); Christopher Caldwell, Counterterrorism in the UK.: After Londonistan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2006, § 6, at 42.
8. See Prime Minister Tony Blair, PM's Press Conference (Aug. 5, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.numberl 0.gov.uk/output/Page804 .asp).
9. See, e.g., JUSTICE, DRAFT TERRORISM BILL PRELIMINARY BRIEFING 4 (Sept.
2005), http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/draft%20terrorism%20bill%20prelim%20
JUSTICE%20briefing%20sept%2005.pdf.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press ... ").
11. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he privileges of free speech..., belonging to every citizen of the United States,
constitute essential parts of every man's liberty.").
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recognized its contribution to the American political system.' 2  They
have recognized its contribution to the protection and maintenance of all
other freedoms. 13 But they have also frequently recognized that freedom
of speech is not limitless. In the words of Justice Brandeis, exercise of
that right "is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is
required in order to protect the State from destruction or from serious
injury, political, economic or moral."' 5 The Supreme Court has found
the existence of such circumstances in times of war' 6 and when faced
with a threat perceived to be so dire that the language of incitement is
inimical to the existence of the nation itself.'7 During these times, the
Court has permitted government to sanction speech that has the potential
to incite others to take lawless action or engage in violent revolution. 18
This Comment poses the question of whether a speaker in America
might be punished for speech glorifying terrorism, following a
hypothetical attack on American soil and congressional response in the
form of a statute like the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2006. That
is, if Congress passed legislation punishing speech glorifying terrorism
and the government subsequently arrested a citizen for speech deeming a
suicide bomber a "martyr," how might the judiciary respond? I will
assess the language, which arguably constitutes advocacy to commit
12. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Framers "believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth").
13. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("I have always believed that the First Amendment is the keystone of our Government,
that the freedoms it guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction of all
freedom.").
14. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371 (recognizing that the Constitution does not
confer an absolute right to speak whatever one may choose); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that the right of free speech is not absolute); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920) ("[F]ree speech is not an absolute right .. ");
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (noting that the guarantees and
immunities embodied in the Bill of Rights "had from time immemorial been subject to
certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case").
15. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). But see Patterson, 205 U.S.
at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The public welfare cannot override constitutional
privileges ... ").
16. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
17. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509 (1951) (four-justice plurality) ("Overthrow of the
Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
Government to limit speech."). Judge Learned Hand noted that "[n]obody doubts that,
when the leader of a mob already ripe for riot gives the word to start, his utterance is not
protected by the Amendment." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir.
1950).
18. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511 (noting the domestic and global circumstances
presented by Communism); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52-53 (noting wartime circumstances).
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violent acts,' 9 under the current test derived from Brandenburg v. Ohio.
20
However, I will also make a more in-depth examination of cases during
World War I and the Red Scare eras, in recognition of the fact that the
judiciary might look to precedent from these tumultuous times in United
States history to determine which circumstances are so unique, so dire,
that they permit the curtailment of the freedom of speech.
Part II of this Comment contains an explication of England's
Terrorism Act 2006 and presents the hypothetical American legislation.
Part II-A describes the British response to the terror attacks of July 7,
2005. Part II-B describes the resulting legislation, the Terrorism Act
2006. Part II-C examines parliamentary debate regarding the new
legislation. Part II-D provides a brief examination of the British Act in
use. Part II-E presents the hypothetical American legislation.
In Part III, I will analyze the hypothetical American act under the
current state of First Amendment jurisprudence. Part Ill-A discusses the
contemporary test for language that advocates violence or illegal
conduct. Part III-B then applies the current law to the hypothetical at
hand.
Part IV of the Comment looks to eras of American history where the
Nation faced dangerous circumstances, arguably similar to those posed
by terrorism. In this part, I analyze the hypothetical act and speech in
light of the jurisprudential tests and attitudes that predominated at these
times. Part IV-A assesses prominent Supreme Court cases pertaining to
advocacy during World War I to determine the circumstances under
which speech may be constrained. Part IV-A-l analyzes principles
arising from these cases, while Part IV-A-2 applies the principles to the
hypothetical American act. Part IV-B analyzes major Supreme Court
cases dealing with incitement during the Red Scare before and after
World War II, and applies the lessons therein to the hypothetical. After
analyzing significant cases arising during this era in Part IV-B-1, I will
further dissect the principles derived from the cases, examining anxiety
over the threat presented by Communism (Part IV-B-2) and alterations to
the contemporary jurisprudential test to meet the new threat (Part IV-B-
3). In Part IV-B-4, I apply these lessons to the hypothetical and the
conditions presented by the threat of terrorism.
19. The words "advocacy," "incitement," and "encouragement" are used
interchangeably to describe the type of speech discussed in this Comment. Generally,
what is being advocated, incited, or encouraged is violence, illegal conduct, or,
especially, the commission of terrorist acts.




In this section of the Comment, I will discuss the United Kingdom's
response to the terror attacks in London. Specific attention is devoted to
the Terrorism Act 2006,21 with a focus on Part 1 of the Act. Next, I
analyze the debate that took place in Parliament during the passage of the
Act. I will then briefly discuss the application of the Act following
passage. Finally, I present hypothetical American legislation mirroring
the glorification provision of the Terrorism Act 2006 as well as
hypothetical application of this legislation to the statements of a radical
preacher.
A. The British Government Responds to the Attacks
In response to the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, the British
government quickly sought to crack down on terrorism and its
encouragement by radical religious leaders. 22  In an August 5 press
conference, then-Prime Minister Tony Blair unveiled a twelve-point
legislative agenda to deal with acts of terrorism and conduct which might
encourage or promote future attacks.23 Among the proposals were new
speech-based grounds for deportation and exclusion,24 as well as new
anti-terrorism legislation, including the offense of condoning or
glorifying terrorism. 25 Blair noted that while the tolerance and good
nature of the British nation had "won the admiration of people and
nations the world over," the situation was very different after the
attacks.26 The British people were proud of their tradition of tolerance,
the Prime Minister argued, but he was "acutely aware" of a
determination that the tradition "should not be abused by a small but
fanatical minority. 27 In recognition of the events surrounding the 7/7
attacks, Mr. Blair felt that it was time to deal with those who incited or
proselytized for extremism and acts of terror.28
Civil liberties organizations in Britain responded quickly with
concerns about the amount of speech which might fall within the wide
21. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.).
22. See Lasson, supra note 5, at 25-26; Minow, supra note 5, at 480-81; Terrorism
and Civil Liberties: Watch Your Mouth, supra note 2.
23. See generally Prime Minister Tony Blair, PM's Press Conference, supra note 8
(setting out the twelve-point agenda).
24. The proposed new grounds included "fostering hatred, advocating violence to
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swath of the proposed laws. 29 The comments of the Attorney General,
Lord Goldsmith, did not ameliorate their concerns; he indicated that
radical imams might even be charged with the ancient law of treason, a
position from which he quickly retreated.30  JUSTICE, a UK-based
human rights and legal reform organization, noted that the scope of the
proposed law criminalizing the glorification of terrorism was so broad
that it might cover any reference to political violence against any
government in the world-past, present, or future.3' JUSTICE further
expressed concern that, without an intent requirement, the provision
would capture the speech of those who had no intent of glorifying terror,
consequently posing "a serious threat to legitimate free expression.'
32
The new offenses proposed by Mr. Blair's government underwent a
variety of changes through Parliamentary debate before the completed
legislation emerged as the Terrorism Act 2006 in the spring of that
year.33 For a greater understanding of the issues raised by the legislation,
this Comment will first present the Act as passed, and then discuss the
objections that the legislation encountered during debate.
B. The United Kingdom Terrorism Act 2006
The Terrorism Act 2006, 34 as passed by Parliament, is divided into
two parts. In general, Part 1 of the Act sets out offenses, while Part 2
includes miscellaneous provisions.35
1. Part 1: Offenses
Part 1 contains a variety of new offenses, amendments to existing
offenses, and related provisions.36 This Comment principally discusses
the offense of Encouragement of Terrorism, which includes the
glorification provision and is found in Part 1, section 1 of the Act.37
However, Part 1 also sanctions a variety of other terrorism-related acts
worthy of note. For example, Part 1 of the Act criminalizes preparation
of terrorist acts, training for terrorism, and presence at a terrorist training
camp.38 Further, Part 1 prohibits making, possessing, or misusing
29. See, e.g., Watch Your Mouth: Terrorism and Civil Liberties, supra note 2.
30. See id.
31. JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 9.
32. Id. at4.
33. See BBC News, Q&A: Terrorism laws, July 3, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk news/politics/4715478.stm.
34. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.).
35. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, nn.I 1-12 (Eng.).
36. See id.
37. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 1, § 1 (Eng.).
38. See Terrorism Act §§ 5, 6, 8.
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radioactive materials, or making terrorist threats related to nuclear
facilities. 39 Part 1 also extends liability for several terrorism-related
offenses to individuals outside the United Kingdom.4 °
a. Section 1: Encouragement
Several of the more sweeping and contested provisions of the
Terrorism Act 2006 pertain to free expression issues arising under
offenses included in Part 1.4 1  The offense of Encouragement of
Terrorism 42 is perhaps the most expansive, supplementing the common
law offense of Incitement by extending liability to those who indirectly
encourage or glorify the commission of a terrorist act.43 The offense
applies to a statement likely to be understood by members of the public
who hear or read the speech as a "direct or indirect encouragement or
other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation
of acts of terrorism. '44 The breadth of the offense is somewhat curtailed
through the presence of the word "likely" and the inclusion of a mens rea
requirement.4 5 At the time of the statement,46 an offender must intend for
the hearer to be directly or indirectly encouraged to commit, prepare, or
instigate an act, or be reckless as to whether the statement will have such
an effect.47 While the requirement of intent or recklessness appears to
narrow the scope of the offense, the range of conduct constituting a
crime is widened by subsection 3, which includes the glorification
provision and greatly expands the amount of speech that is "likely to be• - 48
understood" as encouraging terrorism.8 Subsection 3 provides that
statements that are likely to be understood by members of the public
as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of acts of
terrorism ... include every statement which (a) glorifies the
commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or
generally) of such acts or offences; and (b) is a statement from which
39. See Terrorism Act §§ 9-12.
40. See Terrorism Act § 17. It should be noted, however, that this provision only
covers offenses under section 1 (Encouragement of Terrorism) where they relate to
offenses also included in the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism. See Terrorism Act, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, nn.82-83.
41. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 1 (Eng.). The controversy of the new
glorification offense contained within section 1 can be seen in the parliamentary debate
discussed below. See discussion infra Part II.C.
42. See Terrorism Act § 1.
43. See Terrorism Act, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, nn.20, 24.
44. Terrorism Act § 1.
45. See Terrorism Act § 1(1), (2).
46. See Terrorism Act, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.23.
47. See Terrorism Act § l(2)(b).
48. See Terrorism Act § 1(3).
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those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer
that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should
be emulated by them in existing circumstances.
49
Section 20, which provides definitions for terms found in Part 1,
indicates that "glorification" includes "any form of praise or
celebration." 50  Section 20 also states that "conduct that should be
emulated in existing circumstances" includes speech referring to conduct
that serves as an illustration of the type of acts that should be emulated.5
Thus, the section's guide to interpretation only leads to greater
confusion.
The Home Office's Explanatory Notes provide a modicum of
explanation. The Notes submit the hypothetical that if a statement
glorifying the July 7 attacks on the London Underground could
reasonably be interpreted as seeking emulation of any severe disruption
to the London transit network, the statement would fall under the
offense.52 This hypothetical suggests that a terrorist act need not
specifically mirror the conduct glorified in speech to fall under the
provision. Thus, a speaker might be charged for celebrating terrorist act
X even if a listener interprets the statement as suggesting that he commit
terrorist act Y. In fact, the Home Office indicates that the speech need
not refer to a specific act of terrorism at all under subsection 5 (which
provides guidance to subsections I through 3), nor does a listener need to
understand it as referring to a specific act.5 3 Accordingly, the offense
appears to criminalize even a general statement, describing a
hypothetical suicide bomber as a martyr, which a member of the
audience might reasonably believe is an instruction for him or her to
engage in the suicide bombing of some unspecified location at some
unspecified point in time.
54
Further complicating the offense, section 1 also indicates that
glorification, or any statement or publication for that matter, need not
49. Id.
50. Terrorism Act § 20(2).
51. Terrorism Act § 20(7).
52. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.24 (Eng.)
(emphasis added).
53. See Terrorism Act, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.26; see also Terrorism Act
§ 1(5)(a). Section (1)(5)(a) states that "[i]t is irrelevant for the purposes of subsections
(1) to (3)... whether anything mentioned in those subsections relates to the commission,
preparation or instigation" of acts of terrorism in particular or generally. Terrorism Act
§ 1(5)(a). The Explanatory Notes clarify this language by asserting that "subsection (5)
sets out that the statement, or how it is likely to be understood, need not relate to a
specific act of terrorism .... Terrorism Act, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.26.
54. See Christina C. Logan, Comment, Liberty or Safety: Implications of the USA
PATRIOT Act and the UK. 's Anti-Terror Laws on Freedom of Expression and Free
Exercise of Religion, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 863, 875, 888 (2007).
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actually encourage or induce a listener to action to subject the glorifier to
punishment.55  Therefore, the very statement itself constitutes the
offense, and no link is required between the speech and an act of
violence.56
b. Section 2: Dissemination
Section 2 of the Terrorism Act proscribes the dissemination of
terrorist publications, 57  defined as publications likely "to be
understood... as a direct or indirect encouragement" to commit terrorist
acts or to be useful in the perpetration or preparation of such acts.58
Again, the legislation is expansive in its construction, including sanctions
for publications which glorify terrorist acts, with no regard for whether
the recipient is in fact encouraged or induced to commit an act of
terrorism. 59 Dissemination of the prohibited material may occur via the
Internet, but a notice provision enables a site operator to remove the
material and thereby avoid the perception that he or she endorses the
statement.6°
c. Section 17: Commission Abroad
As mentioned above, the new or amended laws included in the
Terrorism Act 2006 are applicable to persons speaking or publishing
statements outside of the United Kingdom.6 1  The breadth of the
provision extending liability to acts outside the country is somewhat
lessened by the fact that it applies only to statements that encourage
commission, preparation, or instigation of a Convention offense.62 While
this limitation theoretically curtails the extraterritorial application of the
Act to specific conduct or subject matter, it remains worth noting that the
55. See Terrorism Act § 1(5).
56. See Terrorism Act, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.26 ("[Ilt is not necessary in
order for the offense to be committed for an act of terrorism ... actually to take place.").
57. See Terrorism Act § 2.
58. See Terrorism Act § 2(3)(a), (b). The publication in question may be understood
as encouragement not only by those to whom it is available, but also to those who might
obtain it "as a consequence" of conduct constituting dissemination under subsection (2).
See id.
59. See Terrorism Act § 2(4), (8).
60. See Terrorism Act §§ 3, 4. Under sections 3 and 4, a constable would serve the
site operator with a notice decreeing the material to be "unlawfully terrorism-related,"
after which the recipient would have two days to remove or alter the material. See
Terrorism Act § 3(3).
61. See Terrorism Act, § 17; see also Minow, supra note 5, at 480-81.
62. See Terrorism Act § 17(2)(a). The Convention offenses, listed in the Schedule to
the Act, include numerous areas of concern, including explosives, terrorist funds, and the
hijacking of an airplane. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, sched. I (Eng.).
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government may apply the anti-terrorism legislation to individuals,
whether British citizens or not,63 and whether those individuals are
actually within the British realm or not.
64
d. Defenses under Sections 1 and 2
Sections 1 and 2 of the Act provide a defense that would be
particularly useful to the media.65 If the government cannot prove that a
defendant intended his statement to directly or indirectly encourage an
act of terrorism, that defendant can raise the defense that the statement
"neither expressed his views nor had his endorsement." 66  A similar
defense exists for the publication of terrorist material under section 2.67
Thus, a news outlet may report on the statements or publications of a
terrorist without fear of committing an offense.68
However, the defense found in section 1 only applies to cases where
the government has failed to prove intent to encourage or induce the
commission, preparation, or instigation of terrorist acts.69 Similarly, the
defense found in section 2 only applies where the government has failed
to prove intent and where the material disseminated merely encourages
terrorism, as opposed to material that would be useful for terrorist
purposes. 70  Additionally, both defenses require that, "in all the
circumstances," the material in question did not express the views of the
broadcaster.7'
2. Part 2: Miscellaneous Provisions
Part 2 of the Act includes miscellaneous provisions relating to
terrorism offenses, such as additional grounds for the government to ban
an organization and the controversial extension of the period in which
63. See Terrorism Act § 17(3).
64. See Terrorism Act § 17(4). Subsection 4 specifies that certain offenses (listed in
subsection 2 and including Encouragement) when "committed wholly or partly outside
the United Kingdom" may be subject to proceedings anywhere within the United
Kingdom, see Terrorism Act § 17(4)(a), and may be treated as having occurred within the
United Kingdom "for all incidental purposes," see Terrorism Act § 17(4)(b).
65. See Terrorism Act § 1(6); Terrorism Act § 2(9).
66. Terrorism Act § 1(6). The defense therefore appears to cover defendants who
are reckless as to the effect of their statements.
67. See Terrorism Act § 2(9).
68. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.27 (Eng.).
69. See id.
70. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.36 (Eng.) (citing
Terrorism Act § 2(9) and (2)(10)). Accordingly, it appears that the publication of
material useful to the preparation of terrorist acts would be punishable regardless of
whether or not the publisher endorsed it.
71. Terrorism Act §§ ](6)(b), 2(9)(b).
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the government may detain a terror suspect without charge.72 Relevant
to a discussion of free expression is the amendment of portions of the
Terrorism Act 200071 ("TACT") that outlaw organizations deemed to
promote or encourage terrorism.74 Under the Terrorism Act 2006,
glorification of terrorism became an additional ground for the
government to ban an organization under the TACT.75 This amendment
thereby increases the power of the Secretary of State to proscribe or ban
an organization alleged by the government to be involved in terrorism
under section 3 of the 2000 Act.76 Consequently, individuals may be
subject to liability for membership in, or support of, such an
organization.77
C. The Terrorism Act in Parliament
Not surprisingly, the Terrorism Act 2006 provoked a great deal of
debate as it passed through Parliament.78 Members of Parliament from
all parties registered their opposition to, or concerns with, the Act; 79 most
criticism was directed at two particular provisions.80  Then-Prime
Minister Blair endured his first defeat in the House of Commons in eight
years over the first point of contention, the proposed ninety-day
extension of the period during which police could hold terrorism suspects
72. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 2, §§ 21-35 (Eng.).
73. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.).
74. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 2, §§ 21, 22 (Eng.).
75. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 2, § 21 (Eng.).
76. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, pt. 2, § 3 (Eng.); see also BBC News, Q&A:
Terrorism laws, supra note 33.
77. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.99 (Eng.);
Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, pt. 2, § 11 (Eng.) (membership); Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, pt.
2, § 12 (Eng.) (support).
78. See, e.g., BBC News, Q&A: Terrorism laws, supra note 33 (noting that the new
law "had a rocky ride in Parliament"); BBC News, MPs Agree Terror Detention Limit,
July 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/6289020.stm; Blair Bashing:
Labour's Terror Rebellion, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 13. Under the British
legislative system, most bills become acts following debate and passage by both the
House of Commons and House of Lords. See BBC News, Guide to Parliament: Law-
making, Oct. 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/6999683.stm. At the
"First Reading" of the bill, the legislation is published to the House of Commons. During
the "Second Reading," the legislation is debated by Members of Parliament. Following
amendment by committee or by Parliament as a whole, the bill undergoes a final vote
during the "Third Reading." The House of Lords then addresses the bill through the
same process. Final approval comes from the House of Commons, after which the
legislation is sent to the Queen for "Royal Assent." Following Crown approval, the bill
becomes an act. See id.
79. See Blair Bashing: Labour's Terror Rebellion, supra note 78; see also
discussion infra Part II.C.
80. See BBC News, Q&A: Terrorism laws, supra note 33.
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without charge. 81 After defeat in Parliament, where opposition leaders
deemed the proposal reminiscent of conditions in Apartheid South
Africa, the extension was reduced to twenty-eight days.82 The second
major source of contention, and most relevant to this Comment, was the
addition of the glorification provision to the British laws. 83  A
presentation of the speeches in opposition to this provision would be far
too cumbersome and lengthy to include in this Comment. However,
several general categories of opposition are worth noting, as they would
surely replicate opposition to any similar proposed law in the United
States.84
Perhaps the most common theme throughout the debate was
concern over the broad expanse of the proposed law.85 A great deal of
discussion centered on the concern that statements in support of
"freedom fighters" against oppressive regimes worldwide might be
perceived as glorification of acts of terrorism. 86 Clive Betts, a member
of Prime Minister Blair's own Labour Party, indicated that his Muslim
constituents felt criminalized by the legislation for voicing their support
for "resistance to what they regard as the occupation of Palestine" or for
"freedom fighters in Kashmir.'87 Even more often, Members of
Parliament ("MPs") spoke of their own support for "freedom fighters" in
their lifetimes, and demanded to know whether they too would have been
swept up by the Act.88 Tony Lloyd, also a member of the Labour Party,
noted that "many of us here lived through periods in our political lives
when we have not simply sought to explain but actively advocated the
concept of armed force as a legitimate defence" against oppressive and
81. See Blair Bashing: Labour's Terror Rebellion, supra note 78.
82. See Repeat Offending: Labour and the Law, EcONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 34;
see also BBC News, Q&A: Terrorism laws, supra note 33.
83. See, e.g., 438 PARE. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 322, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051026/debindx/51026
-x.htm (Secretary of State for the Home Department Charles Clarke, noting parliamentary
members' doubts about the glorification provision).
84. Generally, opposition to the law fell into the following categories: concerns over
the expanse of the law, see, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 348-50 (noting
concerns that the term "glorification" and the provision itself were too broad); concerns
that the law would impinge on the marketplace of ideas, see, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(Pt. No. 53) (2005) 367 (noting that the right of free speech should remain unimpinged,
even in the face of offensive statements); concerns that provisions of the law were simply
too vague, see, e.g., 438 PARE. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 357 (noting that the
proposed law was vague and would therefore infringe on freedom of speech).
85. See, e.g., BBC News, Q&A: Terrorism laws, supra note 33 (noting critics'
concerns that such laws could have even caught up supporters of Nelson Mandela during
the era of Apartheid in South Africa).
86. See, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 324.
87. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt, No. 53) (2005) 338.
88. See, e.g., 438 PAR. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 364.
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undemocratic regimes.8 9 MPs from both parties cited their support for
current resistance movements, 90 and asked if they themselves would fall
under the overly broad glorification provision for expressing support for
opposition forces in Burma,91 Zimbabwe,92 and Iran.93  Other MPs
questioned whether the glorification provision would be used to
prosecute public figures such as American evangelical Pat Robertson,94
the then-Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland Bertie Ahem,95 or even
Cherie Blair, wife of the British Prime Minister.96 Especially during the
Bill's second reading, MPs engaged in a great deal of debate, noting a
national tradition of support for those who opposed oppressive regimes
world-wide and seeking an assurance that the glorification provision
would not criminalize "those who plead for decency and change in their
societies," many of whom are initially "labeled as terrorists but later
lauded as freedom fighters." 97
Similar to the tradition of support for freedom fighters, several
members noted their opposition in language echoing the "marketplace of
ideas" espoused by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in American free
speech jurisprudence. 98 Conservative Party MP Douglas Hogg stated
that "the right of free speech should be safeguarded and fought for, even
if it involves hearing things that one might find deeply offensive." 99 As
an example, Hogg noted statements by Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 325. The number of
Ministers asking whether they would be caught under the glorification provision
prompted the acerbic remark by Home Secretary Charles Clarke that "[o]ne of the
exciting revelations through the entire debate has been the transformation of a number of
Conservatives into freedom fighters throughout the world, which is genuinely
entertaining to some of us who have been involved in these matters in various ways over
time." 439 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 63) (2005) 498-99.
91. 438 PAR. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 337.
92. Douglas Hogg, Conservative MP, noted that since the Bill extends to overseas
terrorism, it might criminalize those who spoke in support of movements "designed to
displace by violent means the Administration in Burma or that of President Mugabe."
438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 326.
93. Peter Kilfoyle, Labour MP, noted that every member of Parliament received
"regular missives" from the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which commits acts
of sabotage and violence in that nation. 438 PARE. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 339.
94. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 330 (noting Robertson's advocating for
the assassination of Hugo Chavez).
95. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 368 (noting plans for a parade in
Dublin to celebrate the Easter Rising).
96. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 386-87 (noting Mrs. Blair's statement
expressing some compassion for Palestinian suicide bombers).
97. 438 PAR. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 324.
98. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 367.
99. 438 PAR. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 367.
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celebrating the "glorious volunteers" of the IRA.100 Meanwhile, Labour
MP Shahid Malik noted that during his election campaign he was
plagued by negative speech from radical Muslim organizations and
leaders whom the Act might silence. While he might have had an easier
campaign without them, he felt that so long as "they refrain from overtly
promoting violence, our battle with them must be one of ideas."''
Malik's look to positive, truthful ideas to counter negative, false, or
injurious viewpoints echoes Holmes' explication of the marketplace of
ideas in Abrams v. United States.1
0 2
A number of ministers, especially from the smaller opposition
parties, registered their opposition to the vague language utilized in the
Act. 0 3 Mark Oaten, speaking for the Liberal Democrats, indicated that
his party found the glorification provision unacceptable due to a
vagueness that would have the impact of curtailing speech. 10 4 So too,
Elfyn Llwyd of the Plaid Cymru Party indicated that the law must be
clear so that "those affected understand it and regulate their conduct
according to the law."'
0 5
The Labour Party sought to allay such fears by pointing to the
glorification provision's safeguards. 10 6 Home Secretary Charles Clarke
explained that, given the seriousness of the offense and resulting
punishment, two safeguards had been enacted: First, the person making
the speech must have known, believed, or had reasonable grounds to
believe that someone in the audience would likely perceive the speech as
encouraging terrorism; second, prosecution would only be undertaken if
the Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP") determined that an arrest
was in the public interest. 10 7 Thus, a member of the government would
not have unfettered power to prosecute every speaker whose views he or
she opposed.
However, the cited safeguards did not impress some Members of
Parliament.' 8 Minister Oaten indicated that his Liberal Democratic
Party was concerned that even with the knowledge requirement, the
regulation would still be too dependent on the interpretations of third-
100. Id.
101. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 397.
102. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-... the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."); see also Gitlow, 268
U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that every idea "offers itself for belief and if
believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it").
103. See, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 357.
104, Id.
105. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 383.
106. See, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 335.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 358.
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party actors-namely, the audience members.10 9  Ministers from all
parties seemed less than satisfied with the second safeguard as well.
Minister Hogg suggested that placing power in the hands of the DPP (or,
in the case of overseas terrorists, the Attorney General) was not
reassuring." 0 His concern was that these government officials might
simply do the bidding of the ruling party, with the effect of criminalizing
or chilling all speech in opposition to the actions of the government."'
Richard Burden, a minister from the ruling Labour Party, similarly
expressed his concern that the DPP's role constituted no safeguard,
seeing as how prosecutions might still lead to decisions based upon the
speaker, not the speech." 2 Accordingly, the DPP might arrest those who
glorified politically motivated violence conducted by enemies of Britain,
but "turn a blind eye to statements in support of political violence
committed by our friends." ' 1 3  Minister Burden pointed out that the
perception of such double standards had led to skepticism among the
British Muslim community with regard to the war on terror."
14
Minister Burden's concern illustrated another problem with the
proposed legislation-that perceived double standards and government
oppression might lead to counter-productive results. 15 That is, rather
than excising extremist speakers from the public, the Act could have the
effect of increasing their ranks. John Denham, from the Labour Party,
pointed out that young British Muslims might be afraid of falling under
the Act for speaking out. As a consequence, they might be less likely to
engage in politics, public speech, and democracy to facilitate a change in
their lives, and more likely to turn toward terrorism. 116 Minister Lloyd
109. Id.
110. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 368-69.
Ill. See 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 369 ("[F]ree speech will be
interfered with by the fear of illegality .... ). Hogg pointed out that the Attorney
General was "nothing more than the in-house lawyer of the Government" and an
individual who had recently played a large role in justifying British engagement in Iraq,
to which opposition members of Parliament objected. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53)
(2005) 368.
112. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 402.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 370; see also Minow, supra
note 5, at 489-90 (noting British journalist Mick Hume's argument that prosecutions
under the proposed law could lead to the perception of double standards and the counter-
productive creation of "martyrs to inspire disaffected Muslim youth"). Professor Liaquat
Ali Khan noted the possibility of a similar effect in the United States, if the government
curtailed the First Amendment to punish critics of the war on terrorism, seen as terrorist
sympathizers. If so, "U.S. Muslim immigrants and citizens might face unprecedented
official discrimination and social prejudice, producing more resentments and terrorism."
Liaquat Ali Khan, The Essentialist Terrorist, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 47, 88 (2005).
116. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 370.
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expressed a similar concern that the public interest is not served by
hauling away extremist speakers. The effect, he argued, would be to
cease treating such individuals as "subjects of scorn and social
condemnation and instead put[ting] them in prison cells, thereby making
them martyrs."
' 17
Despite some of these reservations, Parliament passed the Terrorism
Act 2006 in Spring 2006, following debate and amendment. The Act
received Royal Assent on March 30, 2006'18 and went into effect in April
2006.1" 9
D. The Act in Use
For a year after the passage of the Act, the British government
brought no arrests under the glorification provision.1 20  Despite the
invectives of a number of extremist religious leaders in Britain, the
government seemed reluctant to utilize the provision, or unsure of when
the offense might apply, to the frustration of some in the public.'21
However, on April 24, 2007, six Muslim preachers were charged under
the Act as a consequence of inflammatory speeches made in 2004.122
Among those arrested was Abu Izzadeen,123 an extremist Muslim
preacher whose conduct demonstrated a number of the quandaries
inherent in the glorification offense. Izzadeen, born Trevor Brooks in
East London as the child of Jamaican immigrants, converted to Islam at
seventeen.1 24 He became a leader of the radical group al-Ghurabaa (the
Strangers), 125 which the Home Office proscribed in 2006 for glorifying
terror. 1 26  While a number of statements by Izzadeen might fairly be
described as glorifying terrorism, 127 his arrest demonstrated several
117. 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Pt. No. 53) (2005) 365.
118. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n. 1 (Eng.).
119. See BBC News, Q&A: Terrorism laws, supra note 33.
120. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 2, at 12.
121. See, e.g., id.; Nikkah & Lusher, supra note 4, at 2.
122. See Stephen Wright, Beth Hale, Neils Sears, & Daniel Bates, Hate Preacher
Who Praised Bombers Is Among Six Arrested, DAILY MAIL (London), Apr. 25, 2007, at
20.
123. See, e.g., John Twomey, Terror Police Hold "Preachers ofHate ", THE ExPRESs
(United Kingdom), Apr. 25, 2007, at 15.
124. Wright, supra note 122, at 20.
125. Id.
126. Press Release, John Reid, Home Secretary, Home Office, Commencement of
New Terrorism Powers (July 25, 2006), http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/
Commencement-of-New-Terrorism-Po?version=l. Perhaps because Izzadeen did not
admit membership in the organization, he could not be prosecuted even after its
proscription. See Philip Johnston, Firebrand Convert Could Still Be Prosecuted After
Praising July 7 Bombers, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 21, 2006, at 2.
127. See, e.g., John Steele, Militant Blamed Britain for July 7 Bombings, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 25, 2007, at 13 (referencing Izzadeen's refusal to denounce
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problems with the new law. First, as noted above, the new Act was not
used to prosecute Izzadeen for quite some time, whether due to concern
over offending Muslims 128 or the vagueness of the offense. 129 Second,
while Izzadeen has made incredibly inflammatory remarks, he has also
repeatedly stated that he does not support terrorism. 30 Accordingly, it is
conceivable that he could escape conviction with the argument that he
does not possess the requisite mens rea of intent.' 3' Finally, Izzadeen's
arrest could produce the counter-productive results discussed in
parliamentary debate by leading young British Muslims to perceive a
double-standard in the application of the law. 132 Izzadeen's arrest came
less than a year after an incident in which he heckled Home Secretary
John Reid during the latter's speech to Muslims at an event in East
London. 133 Given that the altercation increased Izzadeen's prominence
in England, Muslim youth could conceivably perceive prosecution as an
attempt to silence his criticism of the government.
E. Hypothetical American Legislation and Application
While America prides itself on the protections established in the Bill
of Rights, 134 including the right to free speech, 135 legislation similar to
the Terrorism Act 2006 could conceivably arise in the United States
should there be an attack similar to the July 7, 2005 bombings in
London. First, the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
the July 7 terrorist attacks, calling them "mujahideen activity"); Wright, supra note 122,
at 20 (referring to Izzadeen's description of the July 7 bombers as "completely
praiseworthy" and calling the victims "cowards"); Stephen Wright, Preacher of Hate
'Who Praised 7/7 Bombers'Is Arrested, DAILY MAIL (London), Feb. 9, 2007, at 5 (noting
Izzadeen's identification with the views of the July 7 ringleader and jokes regarding the
victims of the July 7 and September 11 terrorist attacks).
128. See Palmer, supra note 2, at 12.
129. See Mekhennet, supra note 7.
130. Steele, supra note 127, at 13.
131. It seems unlikely that Izzadeen could avoid conviction for recklessness with
respect to his statements. However, the problem could be an issue at trial. Izzadeen
might theoretically argue that statements indicating his lack of support for terrorism
should be given just as much weight by listeners as his apparent support for suicide
bombers.
132. Professor Minow has noted that "[o]verreaction in the form of systematic
mistreatment of minorities can stoke fires of alienation, jeopardizing support for the
nation and potentially increasing the number of people who support terrorists." Minow,
supra note 5, at 456. While Izzadeen's arrest under the law might not constitute
mistreatment, application of the law only to outspoken critics of the government or to
members of the Muslim minority could result in that perception. See, e.g., Khan, supra
note 115.
133. Wright, supra note 122, at 20.
134. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 115, at 88 (calling the First Amendment "the citadel
of the United States Constitution").
135. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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2001 in the United States produced a variety of legislation that continues
to raise civil liberties concerns.1 36 While the PATRIOT Act, 137 enacted
in response to the September 11 attacks, itself imposes no restrictions on
free speech, the legislation may be conducive to further erosion of civil
liberties in the name of security at home. 138 Second, some commentators
already call for legislation or judicial interpretations that will go further
to restrict speech deemed to facilitate or encourage terrorist acts.
1 39
Arguing for the monitoring of religious speech, Professor Kenneth
Lasson has suggested that the contemporary, religion-based oratory of
incitement is more dangerous than the political incitement encountered
during the Cold War: "The communist parties of yesteryear that urged
the violent overthrow of the government did not engage in the kind of
clear incitement as the radical religious movements of today."'' 40  A
perceived increase in religious exhortations to violence has led some to
call for greater punishment of inflammatory, defamatory, and inciting
speech, calls which echo those found in the British press. 141 As Professor
Martha Minow has noted, "[p]ublic fears, both warranted or manipulated
by descriptions of terrorism risks, motivate repeated and increasing
sacrifices of liberties."' 142 Accordingly, should there be a further terrorist
attack on American soil, especially one perpetrated by home-grown
terrorists, it would not be surprising to hear calls, in the interests of
safeguarding the homeland, for legislation cutting a deeper swathe into
136. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 115, at 52 ("A security-conscious Congress has
extended the life of the Patriot Act, which shows that the old law of civil liberties might
have changed forever, formalistically for everyone"); Minow, supra note 5, at 474-75.
137. See generally USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
138. Professor Minow points to the perception of government overreach in permit
denials for demonstrations and protests (as well as the confinement of protestors to "free
speech zones") and in an increase in government surveillance power. Minow, supra note
5, at 464-69. Similarly, one student commentator notes that "the relaxation of laws
regarding government surveillance and wiretapping of suspected terrorists may have a
chilling effect upon certain forms of free speech and free association." Logan, supra note
54, at 880.
139. See, e.g., David G. Barnum, The Clear and Present Danger Test in Anglo-
American and European Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 263, 291 (2006) ("The dangers
posed by advocacy of terrorist violence are real, . . . and the fact that a particular message
advocates violence at some unspecified future time should not necessarily exempt it from
punishment."); Minow, supra note 5, at 484 (noting that while some commentators speak
of over-reaction following the September 11 attacks, "[o]thers warn of American under-
reaction when it comes to speech and expression"). See generally Lasson, supra note 5.
140. Lasson, supra note 5, at 64, 65.
141. Compare Lasson, supra note 5, at 5-7, 74 (urging recognition that discriminatory
speech and incitement to violence should not be tolerated in a free society), with Parsons,
supra note 3, at 25 ("In the end, too much freedom of speech is not freedom of speech at
all.").
142. Minow, supra note 5, at 475.
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the First Amendment. 43  The hypothetical legislation that follows
constitutes just such a statute.
1. Hypothetical Legislation: The Anti-Glorification of Terrorism
Act
Following an attack, such as that described in the Introduction, and
public demand for measures designed to improve safety from home-
grown terrorists, Congress passes the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism
Act. The Act is almost identical to section 1 of the United Kingdom's
Terrorism Act 2006,144 providing as follows:
Section 1: Encouragement of terrorism:
(1) This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood
by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published
as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to
the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism.
1 45
(2) A person commits an offense if: (a) he publishes a statement to
which this section applies; and (b) at the time he publishes it or
causes it to be published, he: (i) intends members of the public to be
directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the
statement to commit, prepare, or instigate acts of terrorism; or (ii) is
reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or
indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to
commit, prepare, or instigate such acts.
146
(3) For the purposes of this section, the statements that are likely to
be understood by members of the public as indirectly encouraging the
commission or preparation of acts of terrorism include every
statement which: (a) glorifies the commission or preparation
(whether in the past, in the future, or generally) of such acts; and
(b) is a statement from which those members of the public could
reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being
143. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 5, at 73 ("Individual liberty should be protected to
the greatest extent possible, but not at the sacrifice of national security.").
144. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 1, § 1 (Eng.).
145. For the sake of this Comment, "acts of terrorism" shall be broadly defined,
including injury or attempted injury to persons or property. Speech to a live audience
(and not disseminated in print) shall constitute publication for the purposes of the offense.
See generally Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 1 (Eng.).
146. As in the Terrorism Act 2006, intent and recklessness shall be the mens rea. See
Terrorism Act § 1(2)(b). Any reference to publishing or publication would include
speeches delivered orally and not written down in any way.
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glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing
circumstances.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the questions how a statement is
likely to be understood and what members of the public could
reasonably be expected to infer from it must be determined having
regard both: (a) to the contents of the statement as a whole; and
(b) to the circumstances and manner of its publication.
(5) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsections (1) to (3):
(a) whether anything mentioned in those subsections relates to the
commission, preparation, or instigation of one or more particular acts
of terrorism, of acts of terrorism of a particular description, or of acts
of terrorism generally; 147 and (b) whether any person is in fact
encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare, or
instigate any such act. 1
48
2. Hypothetical Application: Speech and Sanction
Following the enactment of the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act,
an extremist imam gives a speech in front of a crowd. The radical imam
refuses to condemn the suicide bombers involved in the attack that gave
rise to the new law and states that "the suicide bombers who gave their
lives are completely praiseworthy; they are martyrs. Until the United
States and her allies end their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, they
should be prepared for more acts in the name of Allah." The audience
includes a number of Muslim youth from the area, a predominantly
Muslim community, as well as passersby and citizens protesting the
radical imam's speech. The police are present as well.
After the speech, one of the protestors files a complaint with the
police. The radical imam is charged with violating section 1 of the Anti-
Glorification of Terrorism Act for his statements and is convicted.
Despite claims that the Act violates the guarantees of free speech
inherent in the First Amendment, his conviction is affirmed by an
appellate court and his appeal reaches the Supreme Court. There, the
imam poses the question of whether the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism
147. Thus, the speech ostensibly inciting a listener to commit a terrorist act need not
relate to a specific act of terrorism. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, Explanatory Notes,
Para 1, n.26 (Eng.). The speech may therefore glorify, or reasonably be understood as
glorifying, one terrorist act, and yet fall under the offense for inciting a different terrorist
act.
148. Subsection 5(b) indicates that "it is not necessary in order for the offence to be
committed for an act of terrorism. . . actually to take place." See Terrorism Act,
Explanatory Notes, Para 1, n.26.
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Act and his conviction under it violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.
III. ANALYSIS UNDER CURRENT LAW
The Supreme Court's evaluation of the constitutionality of the Act
would begin with an analysis under the current test for the speech of
advocacy, derived from Brandenburg v. Ohio.149 Accordingly, I will first
discuss the Brandenburg test and then analyze the Anti-Glorification of
Terrorism Act under this jurisprudence.
A. Application of Current Law: Brandenburg v. Ohio
Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's
decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio is the appropriate starting point for an
Act prohibiting speech that could incite audience members to engage in
illegal conduct. 150 Brandenburg presents what is effectively the latest
test in the development of jurisprudence addressing language advocating
violent or illegal conduct. 151
In Brandenburg, the Court held that the constitutional guarantee of
free speech forbade a State from punishing advocacy of the use of force
or the violation of the law "except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.' ' 152  Speech that did not fulfill this requirement
could not be punished as advocacy; 153 statutes that failed to draw this
distinction could not stand.1
54
The defendant in the case, a Ku Klux Klan leader, had been
convicted under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act for speeches made
during several televised rallies.155  Speech from the rallies included
derogatory remarks about minority groups, 156 the announcement of a
149. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
150. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M.
SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 62 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that the Court has followed Brandenburg in
subsequent cases); Lasson, supra note 5, at 53.
151. See Barnum, supra note 139, at 278, 279.
152. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
Specifically, a statute that makes no distinction between "the mere abstract teaching" of a
resort to violence, and the actual preparation of a group for violence and "steeling it to
such action" violates the First Amendment. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
155. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
156. Id. at 446. The statements that could be understood from the recordings included
the following: "This is what we are going to do to the niggers"; "A dirty nigger"; "Send
the Jews back to Israel"; "Let's give them back to the dark garden"; "Save America";
"Let's go back to constitutional betterment"; "Bury the niggers"; "We intend to do our
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march in Washington, D.C.,157 and the statement "We're not a revengent
[sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." 158  The recordings
included images of weapons from the rallies as well as footage of a
cross-burning ceremony. 
159
The Court held that Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act 160 failed to
draw the distinction between "mere advocacy" and "incitement to
imminent lawless action.1 61 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Act
ran afoul of the First Amendment and could not stand. 162  Thus, to
comply with Brandenburg, a law sanctioning advocacy speech can only
target language that is directed at inciting imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite such action.
163
Cases following Brandenburg may help to demonstrate just how
immediate the "imminent lawless action" must be. While unlawful
action following speech might provide an overt act to demonstrate the
likely effect of a statement, 164 the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Company 65 appears to address the timing of such
overt acts. In Claiborne Hardware, the NAACP organized a boycott of
several white-owned businesses. 166 A boycott leader made a statement
suggesting that some members in the boycotting group would physically
part"; "Give us our state rights"; "Freedom for the whites"; "Nigger will have to fight for
every inch he gets from now on." Id. at 446 n. 1.
157. Id. at 446 ("'We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred
thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St.
Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi.').
158. Id.
159. Id. at 445. The prosecution introduced into evidence some of the items from the
recordings, including firearms, a Bible, and a red hood worn by the defendant. Id.
160. OH1oREV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1969).
161. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49. Specifically, the Court read the Act as
including punishment for those "who 'advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety'
of violence 'as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' . . . or who
'justify' the commission of violent acts 'with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the
propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.'..." Id. at 448. The latter category
of speech is comparable to the glorification of terrorists as martyrs and rationalizing their
acts as necessary to achieve some end.
162. See id. at 448, 449. The Court suggested that jury instructions limiting the reach
of the statute could have saved conviction under it; however, the trial judge failed to
provide sufficiently limiting instructions. See id. at 448-49.
163. See id. at 448. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas noted that "[t]he line
between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made
impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts." Id. at
456 (Douglas, J., concurring).
164. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Lasson,
supra note 5, at 54.
165. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
166. Id. at 900.
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discipline African-Americans who broke the boycott and patronized the
businesses. 67 Several weeks and months later, a number of boycotters
engaged in acts of violence against a handful of citizens who ignored the
boycott and the threat. 68  The Court found the violent conduct too
remote in time for the speaker to be held liable.' 69  Thus, Claiborne
Hardware serves as a useful demonstration that even where actual
violent conduct occurs, and even where that violence may be linked to a
prior threat, the passage of time between the two may save the speech
and the speaker.
B. Application of the Brandenburg Test
Under the Brandenburg test, the government appears unable to
convict the hypothetical imam for advocacy to violence. Moreover, like
the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute, the Anti-Glorification of
Terrorism Act fails to distinguish between mere advocacy and advocacy
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely
to incite or produce such action."'' 70 Accordingly, if the Supreme Court
followed the test established by Brandenburg, the Act should be deemed
unconstitutional.
The hypothetical imam praises terrorists, in clear violation of the
Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act, but his speech alone fails to
demonstrate the requisite imminence of violent or lawless action. That
is, in his speech, the imam does not direct his listeners to immediately
arm themselves with explosives and commit a terrorist act. Thus, the
speech itself may not steel any listener to imminent action. Furthermore,
although the imam states that the nation should be prepared for further
acts, his speech is not necessarily directed at producing violent conduct.
Instead, like the Klan leader in Brandenburg, he warns of possible
retaliation against the United States for government action.'
7'
167. See id. at 900 n.28. The speech was not recorded, but according to a sheriff who
was present, the leader "told the assembled black people that any 'uncle toms' who broke
the boycott would 'have their necks broken."' Id.
168. See id. at 904-07.
169. See id. at 928. Specifically, the Court stated that "the acts of violence ...
occurred weeks or months after the ... speech." Id.
170. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
171. One could argue that the imam's warnings are more closely linked to violence
than the Klan leader's vague threats of "revengeance." See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
446. However, subsequent cases before the Court involved speech more extreme than
that in Brandenburg, speech that the Court nonetheless held to be constitutionally
protected. See STONE, supra note 150, at 62-63 (citing, among other cases, the Supreme
Court's decisions in Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902 ("If we catch any of you going
in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."), and Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) ("We'll take the fucking street later [or again].")).
2009]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act appears
unconstitutional under the Brandenburg test. The Act sanctions
statements that are "likely to be understood. . . as a direct or indirect
encouragement" to terrorist conduct but does not require that the conduct
itself is likely to flow from the speech.172 That is, the Act includes the
modifier "likely," but only in connection with how the speech will be
interpreted-there is no requirement that the speech be "likely" to
produce any illegal action. A listener may be likely to understand the
speech as exhorting him or her to violence without being likely to
actually engage in that violence.
The language of section 1(3)(b), "a statement from which those
members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is
being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by
them in existing circumstances," suggests a time component.,73 Still,
"existing circumstances" is a far cry from the imminency requirement of
Brandenburg. The time component included in the Anti-Glorification of
Terrorism Act suggests that the conduct should occur in
contemporaneous circumstances-a potentially long period of time. For
example, the hypothetical imam's statement could be interpreted as
urging violence as long as United States forces remain in Iraq, as
opposed to violence within the hour. Additionally, even if "existing
circumstances" refers to immediate conditions, the Act still lacks a
requirement that the immediate violence be likely, as mandated by the
Brandenburg test.
Finally, even if a listener in the audience at the imam's speech later
committed a suicide bombing similar to the events glorified by the imam,
the Brandenburg test might preclude application of the Act. The speech
could easily be identified as a motivating factor in the bomber's decision
to act. However, a suicide bombing could take weeks and months to
plan and commit. Under Claiborne Hardware, this period of time may
be too great, despite the obvious connections between speech and action.
The present test for advocacy under Brandenburg therefore appears
to preclude conviction for the imam's speech. It also appears to
invalidate the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act under the First
Amendment. However, analysis of past cases dealing with advocacy
suggests that the Supreme Court could very well uphold the Act and
sanction the speech. Two periods in American history are instructive in
analyzing how the Court might respond to a statute prohibiting certain
172. See Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act § I(1), supra Part II.E.I (emphasis
added).
173. See Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act § l(3)(b), supra Part II.E. 1.
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speech in time of peril: the era of World War I and the Red Scare after
World War I and World War II.
IV. A LOOK TO THE PAST
American history is rife with periods where the dictates of the
Constitution are ignored for the sake of safety and security. 174 The
development of free speech jurisprudence confronting language that
advocates violence or unlawful acts provides spectacular examples of
justices shelving civil liberties to prevent anticipated danger to the people
in a time of war or other threat to the integrity of the Nation.
175
Following this precedent, the Court could find that the danger of
terrorism is so substantial that the requirements of Brandenburg are not
an adequate response to the threat.176 Even more likely, the Court could
employ that precedent, including Brandenburg, to find that the perils
presented by terrorism permit the government to punish speech that, in
another time and under different circumstances, would be protected by
the First Amendment.177  The jt~risprudence dealing with language
advocating, encouraging, or inciting others to violence or illegal acts
demonstrates that, at times of tribulation, the Supreme Court has had
little difficulty finding speech with the potential to incite to be
punishable by the government 178-speech strikingly similar to the
hypothetical presented in Part II-E-2, and punished under legislation
reminiscent of the Terrorism Act 2006. Further, this rich history of
judicial responses to perceived danger could easily be used to support a
measure as broad as the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2006. As
Justice Holmes noted in Schenk v. United States, "[w]hen a nation is at
war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
174. See Lasson, supra note 5, at 54 ("It is almost axiomatic that the tenor of the
times determines the degree of protection of civil liberties.").
175. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (punishing speech in a
time of war).
176. See, e.g., Barnum, supra note 139, at 291 ("The dangers posed by advocacy of
terrorist violence are real .... and the fact that a particular message advocates violence at
some unspecified future time should not necessarily exempt it from punishment.");
Lasson, supra note 5, at 71 ("The current threat is perhaps more imminent than any other
that we have ever had to deal with. The threshold of imminence is lower than ever
before.").
177. See, e.g., Barnum, supra note 139, at 290; Lasson, supra note 5, at 74
("Although... [Brandenburg] gave broad protection to speech, the test it announced
could well be interpreted to enable regulation and punishment of incitement emanating
from mosques.").
178. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. 47; see also Barnum, supra note 139, at 290 (noting
that the "clear and present danger" test enables judges to look to the circumstances and
find for the government); Lasson, supra note 5, at 63 (noting that the results of applying
judicial tests "are decidedly different during wartime and peacetime").
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to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight." 179 If a sufficient number of Justices considered the United States
to be at war or presented with similar peril, the Supreme Court might
find the hypothetical speech punishable and the Anti-Glorification of
Terrorism Act presented in Part II-E- l constitutional.' 80
A. Wartime Circumstances. Principles from World War I
The cases arising in the context of World War I demonstrate that the
scope of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech is particularly
limited in times of war.' 8' As such, this jurisprudence is instructive,
because it constitutes a possible source for the Supreme Court to uphold
the hypothetical glorification provision and the radical imam's
conviction. If the Court were to accept that the war on terror constitutes
an actual war, especially in light of renewed terrorist attacks in America,
the cases from World War I could be used to support the government's
ability to prosecute speech under the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act.
Free speech cases from the first several decades of the twentieth
century illustrate how the perception of national peril can lead to
curtailed civil liberties. These cases present an image of the United
States under siege. The language of the decisions demonstrates concern
that the conduct of anarchists, socialists, and citizens opposed to World
War I would touch off violence and revolution on a massive scale. After
an advocate, or perceived advocate, for revolution or an end to the war
raised the issue that his or her speech should be protected under the First
Amendment, states and federal courts alike were quick to point out that
the protections of the First Amendment are not unlimited.'82 Other
jurists went even further, declaring attempts to use freedom of speech as
a defense to government sanction in such instances to be an abuse of the
Constitution itself. 83  As the Supreme Court noted in Gilbert v.
179. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
180. My eternal thanks to Professor Larry Cata Backer, who in Constitutional Law
pointed out that the definitive interpretation of the law is what five Justices say it is, at the
time they say it.
181. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 179.
182. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
But see Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the rights of free speech and a free press were constitutional privileges which
"neither Congress nor any State... can, by legislative enactments or by judicial action,
impair or abridge").
183. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1920) (noting that
advocacy cases presented "the curious spectacle ... of the Constitution of the United
States being invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies of the United
States, and by a strange perversion of its precepts it was adduced against itself').
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Minnesota, "[i]t would be a travesty on the constitutional privilege [the
defendant invoked] to assign him its protection."'
184
1. Key Cases from the Era of World War I
Although the cases from the era of World War I did not arise under
the Brandenburg formulation of free speech, they provide useful lessons.
They serve as a window into how the Court might respond to speech
amidst public perceptions that the Nation and its values are under attack.
Specifically, these cases demonstrate that the Court had little problem
upholding legislation that severely curtailed the freedom of speech in
time of war.
In Schaffer v. United States,185 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the test for language inciting disloyalty or violation of the law
was "whether the natural and probable tendency and effect" of the words
might produce an evil Congress sought to prevent.186 The defendant in
Schaffer had been convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917, a statute
criminalizing speech or prose that could lead to disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of service in the military or naval forces, or lead to obstruction of
the government's attempts to recruit for the war. 187 Schaffer's violation
consisted of mailing a book that presented anti-war opinions. 88
In upholding his conviction, the court asked "whether the natural
and probable tendency and effect of the words ... are such as are
calculated to produce the result condemned by the statute."' 8 9  In its
analysis, the court stated that even if the speech in question did not
mention recruitment or enlistment, it could still run the risk of
obstructing the government's war efforts. 190 A text that attacked the
"justice of the cause for which the war is waged" might so undermine
loyalty that it would dissuade Americans from joining the fight.' 91 Thus,
while Shaffer presents an early iteration of the incitement test, the case
also provides the lesson that a court may draw rather liberal inferences
about the effect speech will have on its listeners.
184. Id. at 333.
185. Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919).
186. Id. at 887.
187. See id. at 887-88.
188. Shaffer's argument, as described by the court, was that the book contained "the
opinion of the author that patriotism is identical with murder and the spirit of the devil,
that war is a crime, and the argument that it was yet to be proved whether Germany had
any intention or desire of attacking the United States." See id. at 887.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 888.
191. Id.
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In Schenck v. United States,1 92 the Supreme Court proposed a more
developed test for incitement, one which demonstrates that the
circumstances in which a speech is made may drive the Court's
decision.' 93 The defendants in Schenk were members of the Socialist
Party who had printed and distributed to future military service members
a document equating military conscripts to slaves and suggesting that the
United States had entered the war for the economic gain "of Wall
Street's chosen few."'1 94 They were convicted under the Espionage Act
for "causing and attempting to cause insubordination, &c., in the military
and naval forces of the United States and... obstruct[ing] the recruiting
and enlistment service of the United States when the United States was at
war with the German Empire."'
' 95
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated that the question to be
asked is whether the nature of the speech and the circumstances in which
it is delivered will create "a clear and present danger" that an evil
Congress sought to prevent will arise.' 96 Upholding the convictions of
the defendants, Holmes noted that "in ordinary times" such language
might be protected.' 97 However, the circumstances of war led to the
conclusion that the speech's effect would be the obstruction of the war
effort-the very "evil" Congress sought to prevent.'
98
In Frohwerk v. United States,'99 the Supreme Court once again
pointed to wartime circumstances and upheld the conviction of the
publisher of a German newspaper in Missouri under the Espionage
Act.200  The speech in question praised the spirit and strength of
Germany and the Central Powers, argued that economic interests and the
influence of England directed America's intervention in the war, and
decried the draft. 20 1 The Court noted that the publisher made no specific
effort to reach Americans subject to the draft, but nevertheless suggested
that the circumstances created by war permitted the criminalization of the
192. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
193. See, e.g., id at 52 ("[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances
in which it is done.").
194. Id. at 50-52,
195. Id. at 49.
196. Id. at 52.
197. Id. at 51-52.
198. See, e.g., id.
199. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
200. Id. at 205, 208-09, 210. Frohwerk did not explicitly rely upon the clear and
present danger test articulated in Schenck, but the Court nevertheless cited the earlier
opinion in its reasoning. See id. at 206.
201. Id. at 207-08. In language reminiscent of the hypothetical imam's speech, the
defendant characterized his praise for Germany as, in Holmes' words, a "warning to the
American people." Id. at 207.
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speech.20 2 In the view of the Court, the defendant had circulated the
paper "in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a
flame," and as such could be punished for his speech.20 3
Using Schenck and Frohwerk for support, the Supreme Court
upheld a state version of the Espionage Act in Gilbert v. Minnesota.
20 4
Gilbert had been charged for making a speech that questioned whether
the President or Governor had been democratically elected, whether the
decision to enter the war had been made by the people, and the reasons
the United States entered the war.20 5 The Court again reasoned that the
"condition of war and its emergency" permitted conviction under the
statute for the defendant.20 6 The Court even went so far as to construe
Gilbert's reliance on the First Amendment as an affront to the
Constitution, stating that "It would be a travesty on the constitutional
privilege [the defendant] invokes to assign him its protection. 2 7
Debs v. United States,20 8 decided in the same year as Schenck and
Frohwerk, provides a particularly useful comparison to the prosecution
of the hypothetical imam. In Debs, the Court upheld the conviction of
Socialist Party leader and anti-war activist Eugene Debs under the
Espionage Act.20 9 Debs had publicly praised five individuals convicted
for helping others avoid draft registration or for otherwise obstructing
recruitment for the war.210 In the words of the Court, Debs had stated
that these "most loyal comrades" were "paying the penalty for standing
erect and seeking to pave the way to better conditions for all
mankind., 211 Debs went on to question the justifications for the war and
to suggest that the workers of the United States should have no interest in
202. Id. at 208-09. While the Court did state that such language could be permissible
even in time of war, the Nation did not "lose [its] right to condemn either measures or
men because the Country is at war." Id. at 208.
203. Id. at 209.
204. 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920). The statute criminalized action "interfere[ing] with or
discourag[ing] the enlistment of men in the military or naval forces of the United States
or of the State of Minnesota" through speech or print. Id. at 326-27.
205. See id. at 327 ("Have you had anything to say as to whether we would go into
this war? You know you have not. If this is such a great democracy, for Heaven's sake
why should we not vote on conscription of men. [sic] We were stampeded into this war
by newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her.")
206. Id. at 327, 333.
207. Id. at 333.
208. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
209. See generally Debs, 249 U.S. 211; see also Barnum, supra note 139, at 273.
210. See Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-14.
211. Id. at213.
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its prosecution. 212 Relying on Schenck, the Court quickly disposed of
Debs' freedom of speech defense under the First Amendment.
213
Next, the Court focused on the question of whether the lower court
had properly admitted into evidence the convictions of the individuals
Debs' had glorified.214 Affirming that decision, the Court reasoned that
the grounds for the convictions of these individuals were important to
show the message Debs intended to convey through his praise, that is, "to
explain the true import of his expression of sympathy and to throw light
on the intent of the address."
215
Notably, the decision, written by Justice Holmes, never mentions
the clear and present danger test, relying instead upon the natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect of the speech. 216 Debs therefore
demonstrates the capacity of the Court to largely ignore the prevailing
constitutional test and rely instead on the circumstances in which a
speech is delivered.21 7
While Schenck and its progeny predate Brandenburg, the reliance
upon circumstances in these earlier cases provides an important lesson.
In most of the Schenck line of cases, the Court relied a great deal upon
the context or circumstances in which a speech is made-specifically,
the circumstances inherent in a time of war.2 8 The ability of Justices to
focus on external facts to determine whether speech constitutes a danger
to society suggests that a Justice may very well consider the times, rather
than the jurisprudential test to be applied, when deciding whether or not
the government may punish a speaker for advocacy. As one
commentator has noted, even where the Court ostensibly applied the
clear and present danger test, its application may not have been
stringent,21 9 with the Court instead largely relying upon the presence of a
212. Id. at213-14.
213. See id. at 214-15 (noting that the jury could find "that one purpose of the speech,
whether incidental or not does not matter, was to oppose not only war in general but this
war, and that the opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect would
be to obstruct recruiting").
214. See id. at 215.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 216; see also Barnum, supra note 139, at 273-74. But see Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951) (plurality opinion) (including Frohwerk in the
line of cases applying the clear and present danger test).
217. Justice Vinson noted in Dennis v. United States that "neither Justice Holmes nor
Justice Brandeis ever envisioned that a shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a
rigid rule to be applied inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of each case."
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508 (plurality opinion) (citing Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382,412 (1950)).
218. Professor David Barnum came to a similar conclusion about wartime
circumstances. See Barnum, supra note 139, at 273.
219. Seeid. at 272-73.
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war. 220  Ultimately, "[j]udicial predictions about whether speech will
create a particular danger are by definition arbitrary., 221 The leeway to
find speech an incitement to some dangerous or illegal act will be
especially conducive to the Court upholding convictions during "war or
other emergencies. 222
2. Application of the Principle
If the government should proclaim that a recent terrorist attack
creates a war-like environment, the judiciary may very well be
responsive to that assessment. Applying the principle extracted above,
that the Court will focus on the circumstances of war more than on the
contemporary jurisprudential test, the hypothetical imam's conviction
could very well stand and the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act could
survive review under the First Amendment.
a. A Nation at War
The present situation with respect to the fight against al-Qaeda and
other proponents of terrorism is not identical to the circumstances present
during World War I. There has been no formal declaration of war passed
by Congress to initiate America's involvement in the current crisis, nor a
draft to wage that battle. Nevertheless, events since 2001 support claims
that the current situation in the world and the Nation is akin to wartime.
The PATRIOT Act, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the detention of
United States citizens evince the feeling that a conflict is at hand. Such
220. See id. The Justices of the Supreme Court were not the only government figures
to be swayed by the circumstances of war, or to return to a more measured attitude after
hostilities ended. Early 20th Century political reporter H.L. Mencken alluded to the
change in the Nation's attitude after the war, noting that Debs' crime "ceased to be a
crime at all long before his prison sentence was completed. Today anyone might commit
it with absolute impunity. In large part, in fact, it has been committed over and over
again by statesmen at the Disarmament Conference, and even by [President] Harding
himself." H.L. MENCKEN, Who's Loony Now?, in ON POLITICS: A CARNIVAL OF
BUNCOMBE 50, 52 (Malcolm Moos ed., 1956). In 1921, President Warren Harding
pardoned Debs and commuted his sentence. See MENCKEN, supra, at 50; STONE, supra
note 150, at 29. Yet Mencken noted that not all were in favor of the pardon. Opposition
came from the New York Times, the Rotary Club, and the American Legion.. See
MENCKEN supra, at 51. Additionally, while Harding and Attorney General Harry M.
Daugherty released Debs, they did so "grudgingly, boorishly, with ill grace. As a final
touch, they managed to make it impossible for him to get home for his Christmas dinner."
See id. at 53.
221. Barnum, supra note 139, at 272. Barnum further explains that "[p]ermitting
judges to take into account the circumstances in which antigovernment speech occurs will
provide them with an opportunity to uphold the punishment of speech whose content
does not come close to constituting 'direct incitement."' Id. at 273.
222. Seeid. at 273.
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sentiment would certainly be heightened by a further attack on American
soil. Indeed, the former administration repeatedly made claims that the
Nation is already engaged in a war on terrorism, 223 and further attacks
would likely bolster support for that claim.
The Court might find statements from the executive and legislative
branches posing the argument that the Nation is at war to be persuasive,
even in the absence of a formal declaration of war.224 In such conditions,
the Court could invoke cases such as Schenck and Frohwerk to
demonstrate that wartime circumstances justify the incarceration of a
speaker who praises the acts of the enemy. The Court may find that such
a speech, delivered to a receptive audience, might constitute advocacy
made in circumstances where "a little breath would be enough to kindle a
flame," 225 and thus pose a significant danger. In these conditions,
legislation as broad as the hypothetical Anti-Glorification of Terrorism
Act could stand.
Certainly, the hypothetical imam's statements differ from those of
the defendants in the cases of World War I, insofar as he does not
advocate the obstruction of the recruitment process needed to conduct the
war.226 As such, he does not directly counsel listeners to hinder the war
effort. But the defendants in the cases arising during World War I were
not always punished solely for direct advocacy to draft resistance.
Instead, the Court found their comments questioning the war or praising
the enemy just as dangerous as opposition to the draft. 227  Like the
223. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002),
in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A22 ("As we gather tonight, our nation is at war .. ");
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), in N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2004, at A 18 ("As we gather tonight, hundreds of thousands of American service
men and women are deployed across the world in the war on terror.").
224. In Pierce v. United States, the defendant, a Socialist, had argued that America
entered the war for commercial reasons, rather than for "the rights of small nations."
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 246-47 (1920). The Court relied upon "common
knowledge," an address by President Wilson to Congress, and a Joint Resolution
declaring war to find that his theory was false. Id. at 251. Applying this principle, the
Court today might take notice of statements by President Bush declaring the Nation to be
engaged in a war. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan.
20, 2004), supra note 223 ("I know some people question if America is really in a war at
all.... [On September 11, 2001 t]he terrorists and their supporters declared war on the
United States and war is what they got."),
225. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).
226. Contrast with this the aims of the speeches found in Schenck, Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-51 (1919), and Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207-08.
227. See, e.g., Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207 (noting the defendant's opposition to
sending soldiers to France, his questioning of the motives for the war, and his praise for
the strength of the German nation); cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619-22
(1919) (declaring that the defendant's invectives against President Wilson and calls for
industrial strike served the purpose of defeating the war plans of the United States).
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228defendant in Frohwerk, the imam has praised the enemy. Like the
defendant in Schenck, he has called for the removal of American troops
from theatres of operation.229  If such statements once constituted an
inherently dangerous display of disloyalty in a time of war,230 the present
Court could conceivably find the same is true of similar statements
arising during the war on terror. An attack on the United States itself, an
event unparalleled in the course of World War I, could only bolster the
finding that the circumstances are so dire that they require the
punishment of certain speech.
b. Unique Precedent: Debs v. United States
As mentioned above,231 Debs v. United States provides an excellent
parallel to the hypothetical at hand, and thus warrants separate
discussion. In Debs, the Court apparently viewed the circumstances of
war as so dire that not only could the government convict individuals
who hindered the draft effort, but it could take action against those who
vocalized their support for these individuals.232 Moreover, in arriving at
this conclusion, the Court took as evidence not only Debs' speech, but
also the convictions of those he praised, to better demonstrate Debs'
illegal and dangerous intent in delivering the praise.233 Thus, when
analyzing the hypothetical imam's speech, a court may admit as evidence
not only his words of glorification, but also the acts of those he glorifies.
This increases the probability that section (3)(b) of the Anti-Glorification
of Terrorism Act will be fulfilled. That is, by admitting evidence of the
acts of those praised, a court creates a strong link between the
glorification of the individuals and the acts they committed. It follows
that a reasonable person is therefore more likely to infer that what is
being glorified is not just the actor (here, a suicide bomber), but his
conduct as well.234
228. See Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207.
229. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51 (noting the defendant's claim that the government
did not have the power to send its citizens abroad to fight).
230. See, e.g., Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1919) (noting
that the defendant had undermined the spirit of loyalty with his excoriations of patriotism
and arguments that there was no proof Germany had any intention or desire to attack the
United States).
231. See supra Part IV.A..
232. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213-15 (1919).
233. Seeid. at 215.
234. The admission of this evidence may further facilitate the imam's conviction in
two ways. First, a jury, hearing and seeing evidence of the devastating terror attack, may
be more likely to convict. Second, the strong link between the praise and the acts of
those praised may increase the danger of the advocacy in the eyes of the judge, jury, or
Supreme Court on review.
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Debs is also important in that it sets a precedent of proportionality.
Debs was convicted for glorifying war obstructionists, an act held to pose
the danger of inciting others to similar conduct.2 35 Since the act of mass
murder involved in a suicide bombing is arguably many times more
serious than aiding another to avoid draft registration, the Court may find
Debs persuasive. If praise for draft obstructionists constitutes punishable
advocacy in a time of war, praising suicide bombers-the enemy itself-
as "martyrs" might make the imam even more guilty than Debs.
There are, of course, a number of dissimilarities between the present
hypothetical and the circumstances surrounding the criminal actions in
Debs. First, Debs' speech involved more than just glorification; he also
spoke of the growth of Socialism and mocked aspects of the war effort
unrelated to recruitment. 236 Second, Eugene Debs enjoyed a prominent
and influential role in America as leader of the Socialist Party and as a
notable member of the anti-war movement.237 Debs also ran for
President of the United States on the Socialist Party ticket multiple
times, 238 including the 1920 election season, during which he was
incarcerated.239 If the prominence of the speaker has any relation to the
magnitude of the danger arising from his or her statements, Debs' role as
a national political figure might have caused his statements to be more
dangerous to the war effort than those of the average speaker. Third, in
addition to praising the obstructionists, Debs avowed even greater
support for their cause, stating outright that if they were guilty, he was
too.240 The hypothetical imam, of course, could not claim that he was
guilty of a suicide attack.
Yet these distinctions may not sufficiently distance the
circumstances in Debs from those presented here. First, Debs'
statements demonstrated a lack of support for the war effort; 241 by
contrast, the imam's glorification of suicide bombers could be construed
as demonstrating direct support for the enemy. There is certainly a
235. See Debs, 249 U.S. at212, 213, 216.
236. See id. at 213-15 (noting Debs' "sneers at the advice to cultivate war gardens").
237. See Barnum, supra note 139, at 273.
238. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 216 (1987). Cox
noted that Debs' popularity at the turn of the Century led to an increase in the Socialist
vote "from a hundred thousand in 1900 to a million in 1912, 6 percent of the votes cast."
Id.
239. See STONE, supra note 150, at 29. The fact that Debs received nearly one million
votes while campaigning from prison is a testament to his prominence.
240. See Debs, 249 U.S. at 214. Debs went even further, admitting to the jury that he
had obstructed the war. Id. It should be noted, however, that this statement appears in
the context of his opposition to war in general. See id. ("I have been accused of





distinction to be made between withholding one's support for the war
and actively engaging in it as an enemy combatant. Second, while the
hypothetical imam is not a national leader, one possible conclusion to be
drawn from the British press is that incendiary statements made by
radical preachers are conducive to an increase in celebrity.
242
Furthermore, although the imam's message might reach fewer listeners
than a speech delivered by Eugene Debs, and would be far less well-
received than a message of opposition to a draft,243 one could reasonably
argue that the threat posed by acts of terrorism is greater than that posed
by opposition to war. The message of the radical imam need only reach
the ears of one receptive listener to cause devastation to the Nation and
the war effort; Debs would have needed a greater flock to cause a true
disruption. Justices might be persuaded by a comparison of the potential
effects of the two speeches and, drawing a parallel to the earlier case,
view the statements of the imam to be vastly more dangerous than any
made by Debs. At the extreme, the effect of Debs' speech would be the
disruption of the war effort, while the effect of the imam's speech would
be the death of civilians and economic turmoil. The facts alone would
arguably enable the Court to distinguish Debs while upholding the rule
of that case, thereby ensuring the constitutionality of the Anti-
Glorification of Terrorism Act and the imam's conviction under it.
c. Summarizing the Lessons from World War I
In short, the free speech cases arising under World War I
demonstrate the principle that, when faced with dangerous
circumstances, the Supreme Court may accede to the curtailment of
freedom of speech, through the punishment of advocacy, in the name of
national security. Specifically, these cases suggest that members of the
Court may accept the view that the presence of war is itself an inherently
dangerous circumstance,244 in the face of which the government may act
to punish speech that poses a threat to the war effort-or to the very
242. See, e.g., Wright, Preacher of hate 'who praised 7/7 bombers' is arrested, supra
note 127, at 5 ("Izzadeen came to prominence after refusing to condemn the 7/7
bombings.").
243. See, e.g., Megan Thee, Support in U.S. for Initial Invasion in Iraq Has Risen, a
Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007, at Al I (noting that two-thirds of Americans in a
national poll favored reducing troop levels in Iraq or withdrawing them altogether).
Naturally, being in favor of reduced troop levels in a particularly controversial conflict is
not inherently an indication of opposition to war. Still, the point remains that one is
likely to find that more Americans oppose war than adhere to the philosophy of the
suicide bomber.
244. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]ar opens dangers that do not exist at other times.").
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245integrity of the Nation. And while the cases from this era propose
several tests to assess the danger innate in the language of advocacy and
determine whether or not it may be sanctioned,2 46 they also demonstrate a
willingness to ignore or alter those tests to meet the circumstances at
hand. 247 Following the rationale-if not the holding-from these cases,
the Court could conceivably find reason to uphold the Anti-Glorification
of Terrorism Act and the imam's conviction under it.
The circumstances intrinsic to a war or quasi-war involving assaults
on American soil are arguably more dangerous than those of World War
I, a conflict waged half a world away. Further, if speech that advocated a
disruption to the war effort fell within the purview of dangerous
advocacy under the circumstances of World War I, a sufficient number
of Justices might be persuaded to find danger in speech that even
implicitly or indirectly threatens further attacks within America. Finally,
as a more specific example of this principle, if praise for those who
participated in the opposition to the war effort in World War I amounted
to disloyalty and dangerous advocacy, at least five Justices could
conceivably find that praise for the perpetrators of domestic terrorism
constituted a perilous invitation to further attack. If so, the Anti-
Glorification of Terrorism Act and the hypothetical imam's conviction
could withstand an attack under the First Amendment.
As a final note, if Justices were receptive to these arguments, the
Court might find the speech capable of sanction even under
Brandenburg. That is, the cases above used different standards than the
Brandenburg imminent and likely danger test to assess whether the
government could criminalize speech advocating violent or lawless
action.248 By the same token, these cases demonstrate that the Court has
once before deemed the circumstances of war to pose severe dangers.249
245. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.").
246. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47 (proffering the "clear and present danger"
test); Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1919) (applying the "natural and
probable tendency and effect" test).
247. See Barnum, supra note 139, at 272-73 (noting that Holmes did not apply his
clear and present danger test to Debs, which came only a week after Schenck). Barnum
notes that the invitation to focus on the circumstances in which speech is delivered, in
addition to the nature of the speech itself, provides judges with the ability to uphold the
punishment of speech that does not approach direct incitement. Id. at 273.
248. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969), with Schenck, 249
U.S. at 47 (proffering the "clear and present danger" test), and Shaffer, 255 F. at 887
(applying the "natural and probable tendency and effect" test).
249. See cases cited supra Part IV.A. 1.
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The government might successfully suggest to the Court that war itself
presents the requisite imminent danger.
B. An Unprecedented Threat: Principles from the Communist Era
Given the focus on wartime circumstances to justify the convictions
for advocacy to illegal action during World War I, one would expect the
Court to have returned to greater freedom of speech after the cessation of
hostilities in 1918. But in the years between the first and second world
wars, Americans perceived a new source of danger to the integrity of the
Nation and its values-the Communist movement.2
The view that Communism presented unique perils and the threat of
an imminent violent revolution in the early- and mid-twentieth century is
now largely regarded as a bizarre and unfounded fear.251 Nevertheless,
the belief that the Communist movement constituted a profound threat,
arising from both foreign and domestic sources, held great sway at the
conclusion of the first and second world wars.252 This fear may have
emanated from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, social unrest
within the Nation, and the rise of Communist governments abroad.253
Fear of Communism produced organizations and government officials
within the United States devoted to finding Communist infiltrators in
American life, the expulsion of political leaders for their affiliation with
the Socialist Party, and the enactment of statutes targeting Communists
throughout the country.254 The prevailing sentiment espoused by many
250. Archibald Cox noted that "[i]n the 1920s the excesses of wartime patriotism
yielded to the 'Red scare.' Criminal prosecution of alleged Communists and anarchists
for conspiring to overthrow the government by force and violence replaced the
prosecution of Socialist critics of the war." Cox, supra note 238, at 220. On the growth
of the Communist movement, the perception of its threat, and the anti-communist
response, see generally William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic
Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 375
(2001).
251. See generally Patricia Leigh Brown, Armageddon Again: Fear in the 50's and
Now, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, § 4, at 10. Brown notes, for example, that
"[i]maginings of doom and suspicions that the neighbors could be Commies led to some
seriously strange ideas." Id.
252. See, e.g., Wiecek, supra note 250, at 377-78 (discussing fears of Communism).
253. See id. at 387-89 (pointing to "a greater sense of urgency" to the suppression of
dissent in the United States after the Bolshevik Revolution, arguing that the country
seemed "vulnerable" to the rise of Communist governments in Europe).
254. See id. at 388-89. Wiecek notes that in 1919 alone, twenty-six states enacted red
flag laws, id. at 389, statutes that prohibited the display of a red flag with a seditious
intent, STONE, supra note 150, at 35 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 141-68 (1941)). Cox points to State legislation requiring loyalty oaths
from teachers, "[a] pervasive fear of being charged as 'soft on Communists' in even
liberal organizations, and "equally widespread fear of the taint of association." Cox,
supra note 238, at 222.
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in the Nation was that Moscow directly controlled political organizations
such as the Communist Party of the United States.255 In the years before
and after World War II, the legislative branch of government passed a
bevy of legislation aimed at the threat of Communism, including the
formation of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, the
reenactment of the Espionage Act, and the enactment of the Smith Act,
which was "the first peacetime federal sedition act in American
history., 256 Given the trepidation that permeated the Nation with respect
to the Communist movement, it is not surprising that the judiciary fell
prey to the same fears.257 In the words of one commentator, "[t]he
Justices of the Supreme Court were not exempt from the fears and beliefs
of other Americans. If anything, they were more forward than others in
cultivating those beliefs and enforcing their consequences. 258
Accordingly, analysis of the advocacy cases arising during this
period demonstrates two important lessons.
First, even in the absence of war, the government, the public, and
the Court may perceive certain threats to be so great as to constitute an
inherent danger to the existence of the Nation, and advocacy pertaining
to that threat may be punished as a consequence. 259 The general tone of
255. See Cox, supra note 238, at 222 (noting that the Communist Party was believed
to be the agent of a Communist conspiracy); Wiecek, supra note 250, at 388. Cox further
notes that Communists "were widely believed to have infiltrated government agencies,"
including the State Department, Treasury Department, and National Labor Relations
Board, as well as academia, labor unions, and the film industry. See Cox, supra note
238, at 222.
256. Wiecek, supra note 250, at 398, 401; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 551 n. 15 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (listing numerous statutes passed from
1919 to 1950 that demonstrate Congress' intent to stymie advocacy of overthrow by
Communists and other groups); Cox, supra note 238, at 222 (discussing the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947, which denied labor unions the right to participate in key processes unless
their officers and those of any international affiliates filed affidavits "denying
membership in the Communist Party"); STONE, supra note 150, at 55-56 (listing other
federal legislation enacted after World War II as part of "an intensive campaign against
the Communist Party and its adherents"). The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, criminalized
knowingly or willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government by force or
violence, publishing or disseminating material to that end, and organizing to that end.
See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 302 n.1 (1957). It should be noted that while
the legislative history of the Smith Act demonstrates that "concern about communism
was a strong factor leading to [the] legislation," Congress nevertheless intended the Act
to apply to a variety of groups. Yates, 354 U.S. at 307.
257. Archibald Cox said of the Supreme Court's various opinions in Dennis v. United
States, "I am left with the feeling that differences of temperament, broad impressions
concerning the forces at work in the country and the world, and inarticulate hopes and
fears played larger parts in these conflicting judgments than hard-headed factual
analysis." Cox, supra note 238, at 224.
258. Wiecek, supra note 250, at 379.
259. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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the reasoning in many of the Communist-era cases demonstrates the fear
of an international revolutionary movement and its perceived impending
success. 260  The threat from Communism, its principles, and the
organizations devoted to its success seems almost laughable in hindsight.
However, the cases arising under this era demonstrate that even the
Justices of the Supreme Court believed the threat credible enough to
constrain speech advocating its tenets. As such, these cases demonstrate
that even in a time of peace, national and international conditions play a
large role when the Court evaluates the language of incitement.
Specifically, when the circumstances include a group presumed-by
citizens and the government alike-to be capable of violence on a
massive scale, the Court may defer to this view and permit the
government to constrain speech in anticipation of a threat.
The second principle to be extracted from the advocacy cases of the
Communist era is similar to the notion expressed above-that in times of
perceived threat to the very existence of the Nation itself, the Court may
respond by altering its jurisprudence to curtail the danger. In other
words, the advocacy cases from the Communist era, like those from the
First World War, show that constitutional tests applied to balance the
freedom of speech against the demands of national security may wilt or
change under varying circumstances. Under the cases arising during the
Communist Era, the Court altered the clear and present danger test to
meet perceived conditions in the Nation and the threat of revolution.6
1. Key Cases from the Communist Era
Three cases serve as useful demonstrations of these two principles
from the Communist era. As with the cases explored in Part IV-A, they
were decided well before the Court established the current test from
Brandenburg. In fact, the Supreme Court expressly overruled one of the
Communist Era cases, Whitney v. California,262 in its Brandenburg
decision. 263 Nevertheless, these three cases serve as profound examples
of where the Court has shelved the promise of the First Amendment
amidst the perception of great danger to the Nation.
In Gitlow v. New York,26 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party for
advocating the overthrow of organized government by force. 265  The
260. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
261. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
262. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
263. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
264. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
265. Id. at 655. The defendant was charged under a New York criminal anarchy
statute. See id. at 654 n. 1.
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targeted speech appeared in a manifesto published by the Party with the
assistance of the defendant.266 The manifesto condemned moderate
Socialism and argued for the necessity of a "Communist Revolution"
through industrial revolts, political strikes, and "revolutionary mass
action., 267 The Court noted the power of a State to punish language that
"imperil[s] its own existence as a constitutional State" and deferred to
the legislative determination that the type of language prohibited by the
criminal anarchy statute used to convict the defendant comprised just
such peril.268  Accordingly, the majority affirmed the conviction and
denied a constitutional attack on the statute.269 The Court reasoned that
since the content of the speech fell within the class of language
prohibited by the statute as dangerous advocacy, the speech ipso facto
constituted advocacy presenting a danger.
270
In Whitney v. California, the Court again deferred to the capacity of
a State legislature to determine when language constituted a sufficient
danger to the State's very existence to be, effectively, illegal per se.271
The Whitney Court upheld the conviction of the defendant under
California's criminal syndicalism act 272 for her participation in the
formation of an organization allegedly assembled to advocate criminal
syndicalism. 273 Specifically, the defendant's conviction arose from her
membership in the Oakland branch of the Socialist Party, which joined
the more radical Communist Labor Party of America in 1919.274 The
defendant's role in the formation of the California branch of the Party
included signing a resolution recognizing political action as a means of
spreading communist propaganda and calling for the capture of political
power by the revolutionary working class.275 The defendant did not sway
the Court with her testimony that she had not intended to participate in
266. Id. at 655. The defendant served on the board of managers of the Revolutionary
Age, "the official organ of the Left Wing" section of the Socialist Party. In his capacity
as business manager, he "arranged for the printing of the paper and took to the printer"
the manuscript of the "Left Wing Manifesto." Id.
267. Id. at 656-57.
268. See id. at 668-69.
269. See id. at 670.
270. See id. at 669-70.
271. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Barnum, supra note 139, at
275.
272. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359 (citing Statutes, 1919, c. 188, p. 281).
273. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359-60. H.L. Mencken deemed the California criminal
syndicalism act "perhaps the most drastic, cruel, disingenuous and nonsensical statute
ever passed in America ... the foulest blow ever delivered at the Bill of Rights ...
[which would have the effect of] railroading scores of foolish and harmless men and
women to prison." H.L. MENCKEN, Little Red Ridinghood, in H.L. MENCKEN ON
POLITICS, supra note 220, at 232, 235.
274. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 363-65.
275. See id. at 365 (presenting the text of the resolution).
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an organization designed to be an instrument of terrorism or violence.276
Citing Gitlow for support, the majority affirmed the capacity of the State,
through its police power, to determine that certain acts or advocacy
involve intrinsic danger to public peace and security, and that the
judiciary should give such determinations "great weight.,
277
Between these decisions and Dennis v. United States, 278 decided in
1951, was a period during which the Supreme Court reversed convictions
under criminal syndicalism statutes. 279 At the conclusion of World War
II, however, the national anxiety returned, 280 as did a similar outlook in a
majority of the Justices on the Court.281  The formation of the Iron
Curtain, the fall of China, the onset of the Cold War, and the
development of an atomic bomb by the Soviets produced concerns about
the rise of Communism. 282  Against this backdrop, the government
276. See id. at 366-68. The Court pointed to the defendant's membership in the
National Party and her acquiescence to its resolution through her continued participation
to negate the claim that she could not foresee the character the state organization would
adopt. See id.
277. See id. at 371. The Court further noted the adoption of similar statutes in other
states in support of the "wide-spread conviction of the necessity for legislation of this
character." Id. at 370-71.
278. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
279. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). These cases contrast remarkably with
Whitney and Gitlow, and correspond with a period in American history where the
Communist Party gained some traction. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 394-95. Wiecek
notes that the Communists benefited from a number of conditions in the United States,
including the Great Depression, President Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union,
and the creation of the antifascist Popular Front. Id. So, too, the alliance between the
United States and the Soviet Union during World War II led to an increase in the
activities and membership of the Communist Party. See id. at 403; cf Barnum, supra
note 139, at 276 (suggesting that while the Smith Act's principle target was the United
States Communist Party, the wartime alliance stayed the government's use of the Act).
Cox proffers several factors for the change in attitude, including the suggestion that the
New Deal "encouraged the expansion of civil liberties" in the Nation. Ultimately, even
during World War II, those who opposed the war "were fewer and fared better" than their
World War I predecessors. See Cox, supra note 238, at 221-22.
280. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 400 ("After the war, .... the nation's very
survival seemed to be bound up with the anti-Red struggle, and indifference or
detachment became impossible for most people."); see also STONE, supra note 150, at 48
("During the post-World War II 'cold war' era, fears over national security again
generated wide-ranging federal and state restrictions on 'radical' speech.").
281. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 406 ("A majority of the Justices regarded
Communists and their Party as sui generis, different from other radical groups..
uniquely threatening to America's national security.").
282. See id. at 416-18. As Wiecek aptly describes the situation, "[w]hat Americans
called 'the free world' was now ranked in hostile array confronting the superior land
forces of the Red Army and the bloc nations." Id. at 417. Judge Learned Hand spoke of
conditions in the world in his opinion for the Second Circuit in Dennis v. United States:
We must not close our eyes to our position in the world at that time [ 1948]. By
far the most powerful of all the European nations had been a convert to
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brought charges under the Smith Act 28 3 against leaders of the Communist
Party of the United States.
2 84
In the ensuing case, Dennis v. United States,28 5 Chief Justice
Vinson, writing for the plurality, adopted and applied a new version of
the clear and present danger test to uphold the convictions of the
defendants.25 6 The new version of the test came from Judge Learned
Hand, who had presided over the case at the appellate level.287 Hand's
test required the Court to inquire "whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as
is necessary to avoid the danger., 288  Applying this test, the Supreme
Court found the Communist leaders guilty of advocating the violent
overthrow of the government of the United States.289
2. Anxiety Over the Threat of Communism
From the language and reasoning employed in the opinions of
Gitlow, Whitney, and Dennis, one can perceive that even the Justices of
the Supreme Court believed Communism to be a significant threat to the
Nation.290 This aspect of the opinions demonstrates that even when the
Country is not embroiled in war, the Court may acquiesce to
contemporary concerns regarding international, revolutionary, political
movements and respond by punishing advocacy related to those
movements. The anxiety can be seen in many of the majority,
concurring, and even dissenting opinions from these three cases,
Communism for over thirty years.... Moreover in most of West Europe there
were important political Communist factions, always agitating to increase their
power.... Any border fray, any diplomatic incident, any difference in
construction of the modus vivendi-such as the Berlin blockade.. .- might
prove a spark in the tinder-box, and lead to war.
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950).
283. See supra note 256.
284. See STONE, supra note 150, at 48; Barnum, supra note 139, at 276; Wiecek,
supra note 250, at 416. The trial took more than nine months and produced an
evidentiary record of 16,000 pages. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497
(1951) (plurality opinion); Cox, supra note 238, at 222-23.
285. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494.
286. See id. at 510-1l; see also Barnum, supra note 139, at 276-77.
287. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201; see also Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510; Barnum, supra note
139, at 277.
288. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212; see also Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (adopting the Hand
test). Hand explicitly withheld a timing requirement from his test, explaining that the test
must discount the "improbability" of success rather than the "remoteness" of any action,
because "it would be wholly irrational to condone future evils which we should prevent if
they were immediate; that could be reconciled only by an indifference to those who come
after us." Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.
289. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17 (plurality opinion).
290. For an examination of the Supreme Court and the anti-communist movement as
background to Dennis, see Wiecek, supra note 250.
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presenting itself in two ways: acceptance of legislative determinations
regarding the threat,291 and anxiety in the very language of the opinion.292
a. Deference to Legislative Determinations of the Threat
In Whitney and Gitlow, the Court relied heavily on the
determination of state legislatures that the Communist movement
presented a novel and dangerous challenge.293
In his opinion for the Court in Whitney, for example, Justice
Sanford pointed to the growing number of states enacting anti-
syndicalism statutes as evidence of the belief that there was a necessity to
halt the growth of organizations advocating the use of violent and illegal
means to bring about industrial and political change.294 Even Justices
Brandeis and Holmes, who had dissented in Gitlow,295 agreed with the
majority in Whitney that the defendant's actions presented a danger.
296
While they did not agree that the legislature should have the capacity to
make the determination of whether particular language inherently
presents a clear and present danger,297 they agreed nevertheless that the
jury could have found that danger did exist under the circumstances of
the case.298
291. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (noting that the State
had deemed certain advocacy to "involve[ ] such danger to the public peace and security
of the State, that these acts should be penalized.... That determination must be given
great weight"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925) ("By enacting the present
statute the State has determined ... that utterances advocating the overthrow of organized
government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare
and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized.... That
determination must be given great weight.").
292. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (deeming the Communist
movement "an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the Government, in
the context of world crisis after crisis"); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 370-71 ("That there is a
wide-spread conviction of the necessity for legislation of this character is indicated by the
adoption of similar statutes in several other States."); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[Tlhere was testimony which tended to establish the existence of a
conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of the World, to commit
present serious crimes."); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669 ("A single revolutionary spark may
kindle a fire that, smouldering [sic] for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration.").
293. Wiecek summarizes this facet of the two cases well: "Under the doctrine of
Gitlow v. United States, when a legislative body makes such a finding, no court may
apply the clear-and-present-danger test, being precluded by the legislative declaration
itself." Wiecek, supra note 250, at 426 (internal footnotes omitted).
294. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 370-71.
295. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
296. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378, 380 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
297. See id. at 374.
298. See id. at 378.
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Similarly, Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis reflects a
willingness to rely on congressional determinations about the threat
posed by Communism. Frankfurter concluded that Congress had the
primary responsibility for balancing the competing interests of free
speech and national security.299 For support, he enumerated the
congressional statutes that he felt demonstrated Congress' determination
that Communists and.similar groups presented a serious danger through
their advocacy of revolution.
30 0
b. Anxiety in the Language of the Supreme Court's Opinions
Just as Debs uniquely demonstrated principles that might apply to
the hypothetical, the Court's opinion in Dennis serves as an important
lesson in how the Court might share the trepidation of the general public.
A majority of the Court, comprised of the plurality and concurring
opinions, demonstrated through their very language a concern that the
threat of communist revolution presented a danger to the security and
very existence of the Nation.30 1
Chief Justice Vinson's description of the Communist Party and the
circumstances at hand demonstrate that he perceived the threat from
Communism to be severe. From the language used in his plurality
opinion, Vinson appears convinced that the defendants and their Party
presented a unique challenge to the integrity of the United States. To
Vinson, the Party goal of political revolution was a threat regardless of
the probability of its success. 30 2 Distinguishing the circumstances from
the "comparatively isolated event[s]" of Gitlow, Fiske, and De Jonge,
Vinson stated that the Court in those instances had not been "confronted
with any situation comparable to the instant one-the development of an
apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the Government, in
the context of world crisis after crisis. 30 3 While applying the Hand
299. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
300. See id. at 550-51, 551 n.15.
301. For a presentation of similar expressions of concern from Justices of the era,
including those made outside the Court, see Wiecek, supra note 250. Wiecek notes that
the Court "shared in the nation's mounting anxiety over international crises and believed
in the emerging image of domestic Communists. A majority... regarded Communists
and their Party as sui generis, different from other radical groups like the Klan, uniquely
threatening to America's national security." Id. at 406.
302. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509-11 (plurality opinion) ("Certainly an attempt to
overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset.., is a
sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.... We must therefore reject the contention that




variation to the clear and present danger test, Vinson described the
circumstances produced by Communism, stating that the formation of a
highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members
subject to call when the leaders ... felt that the time had come for
action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions,
similar uprising in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our
relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least
ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were
justified on this score.
30
4
This description of the threat from Communism seems eerily prescient of
the danger that organizations such as al-Qaeda present today.
The language employed by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion similarly suggests that he viewed the threat posed by
Communism to be serious and novel. Posing the issue presented by the
case as one of striking the appropriate balance between the defendants'
right to advocate a political theory and the government's right to
safeguard the Nation through a measure like the Smith Act, he noted that
"[flew questions of comparable import have come before this Court in
recent years. 3 °5 While Frankfurter's opinion discussed the origins of the
First Amendment and the essential restrictions it places on
government, 0 6 he nonetheless concluded that Congress had the primary
responsibility for balancing the competing interests. 307 Frankfurter listed
a number of statutes enacted by Congress as a demonstration of that
body's determination, "after due deliberation" that advocacy by
Communists and other groups to overthrow the government presented a
serious danger to the Nation.30 8
Contrasting the circumstances before the Court in Dennis with those
in Gitlow, Justice Frankfurter determined that the legislature had struck
the appropriate balance through the Smith Act.30 9 In enumerating those
circumstances (specifically, the danger posed by the tenets of the Party),
304. Id. at 510-11. The fact that no revolution actually occurred in the years between
1945 to 1948, the period during which the defendants were active, was irrelevant to Chief
Justice Vinson, and "no answer to the fact that there was a group that was ready to make
the attempt." Id. at 510.
305. Id. at 518-19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 519-25. Frankfurter noted that the First Amendment's restriction on
government "exacts obedience even during periods of war; it is applicable when war
clouds are not figments of the imagination no less than when they are." Id. at 520. Given
his subsequent deference to Congress with respect to punishment of the speech of
advocacy, this statement seems somewhat at odds with the rest of his opinion.
307. See id. at 525.
308. See id. at 550-51, 551 n.15.
309. See id. at 541-42 ("[T]here is ample justification for a legislative judgment that
the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat to national order and security.").
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Frankfurter added his own evidence to that found by the jury.310 This
included data on Communist membership from the now-infamous House
Un-American Activities Committee, a report of the Canadian Royal
Commission appointed to investigate espionage, and an observation of
the movement's gains and behavior throughout the world.311
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion also demonstrates serious
concerns about the threat posed by Communism. Presenting the ethos as
something of a graduation from the Anarchist movement, Jackson argued
that Communism was "a more sophisticated, dynamic and realistic
movement," which through "an aggressive international Communist
apparatus ... has seized control of a dozen other countries., 312  His
discussion of the development and goals of the Communist movement
presents a sense of imminent danger and the feeling that an attempt to
overthrow the government of the United States was almost inevitable.313
Jackson stated that, to the Communists, overthrow of a government
was to be "the consummation of a long process," anticipated but not
acted upon until the time was right.314 Since revolution was to be the
final stage, taken when government response would be too late, he
viewed the clear and present danger test as insufficient to counter the
threats posed by the Communist movement.31 5  Justice Jackson
310. See id. at 546-48.
311. Id.
312. See id. at 563 (Jackson, J., concurring). While Jackson at one point identified
Communism as "the antithesis of anarchism," id. at 563 (citing Beard, Individualism and
Capitalism, 1 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 145, 158), he nevertheless asserted that many of the more
"incendiary radicals" of the Anarchist movement had joined the Communist Party. See
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 563.
313. See id. at 563-66 (describing the goals of the movement, the means it employed,
and its impact in nations abroad); see also id. at 578-79 ("I have little faith in the long-
range effectiveness of this conviction to stop the rise of the Communist movement.").
314. Id. at 566.
315. Id. at 564-65, 567. Jackson noted that the Communist movement might not even
require force and violence, "because infiltration and deception may be enough." Id. at
565. This viewpoint seems to directly evoke the quintessential fear of Communism, that
proponents of the movement would infiltrate American institutions. On this concern, see
Cox, supra note 238, at 222, and Wiecek, supra note 250, at 375. Wiecek notes that
Chief Justice Taft even went so far as to suggest that the Supreme Court itself had been
infiltrated, and was "determined to stay on the Court as long as possible 'to prevent the
Bolsheviki from getting control."' Wiecek, supra note 250, at 393 (citing Taft to Horace
Taft, Nov 14, 1929, reel 315, William Howard Taft Papers, LCMss) (internal citation
omitted). Wiecek suggests that the "Bolsheviks" to whom Taft referred were Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, and Harlan Fiske Stone. Wiecek, supra note
250, at 393. By contrast, Justice Douglas, dissenting in Dennis, was far from convinced
that Communists had or would infiltrate American industry or government. See Dennis,
341 U.S. at 589 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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concluded his concurrence with rather dire doubts that contemporary law
could constrain the movement.316
While subsequent cases moved away from the perception of
Communism as an unparalleled threat,317 incapable of restriction by the
First Amendment jurisprudence of the past, the lesson is an important
one. The opinions of the Dennis case demonstrate the Court's
susceptibility to the fears of the Nation.
3. Altering the Test to Meet New Threats
Gitlow, Whitney, and Dennis also demonstrate that in these periods
where the members of the Supreme Court echo the sentiments of the
Nation as a whole, they may alter existing incarnations of First
Amendment jurisprudence to meet the perceived danger.
In Gitlow, the majority limited the (ostensibly) reigning clear and
present danger test to accommodate legislative determinations that some
speech carried with it an innate threat to society.31 8 The majority
proposed the rule that where a legislature has determined that a certain
category of language, in and of itself, constitutes a clear and present
danger, a court may not assess whether specific speech that falls within
that category is likely to bring about the danger.319 The language is
simply too dangerous, and must be punished. 320  From this class of
legislation, the majority distinguished statutes that did not refer to
language itself, but rather prohibited certain acts involving substantive
danger.321 Courts were to use the "clear and present danger" and "natural
tendency and probable effects" tests to assess the danger presented by
advocacy only under these more general statutes.322 Justices Holmes and
Brandeis dissented, arguing that the clear and present danger test should
316. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 578-79 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra note
313 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); see also Barnum, supra note 139, at 277-78.
318. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925).
319. See id. at 669-70, ("[W]hen the legislative body has determined generally...
that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be
punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class
is likely ... to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration. It is
sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the language comes
within its prohibition."); see also Dennis, 341 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion) (noting that
the Gitlow majority refused to apply the clear and present danger test to a statute where
the "legislature had found that a certain kind of speech was, itself, harmful and
unlawful").
320. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669-70.
321. See id. at 670-71.
322. See id.
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have been applied, under which the speech in question constituted no
present danger.
323
The Court adhered to the Gitlow rule in Whitney, supporting the
right of the California legislature to categorize certain speech as creating
an inherent danger.324 Because the defendant had participated in the
organization of a party with viewpoints banned by the statute, she was
guilty-regardless of the peril her conduct actually raised.325
The plurality and concurring opinions in Dennis similarly
demonstrate that contemporary jurisprudence may fluctuate to meet the
perceived threat of the day.326 Chief Justice Vinson noted for the Court
in Dennis that slavish adherence to the established test would not
adequately meet the demands presented by the circumstances of an
individual case.327 This statement hewed closely to Judge Hand's prior
statement that the clear and present danger test could not be applied
rigidly, but must instead be evaluated in light of the facts before a
court.328  Chief Justice Vinson's rhetoric suggests that he viewed the
circumstances before the Court in 1951 as significantly more threatening
than those presented in Gitlow.32 9 Accordingly, Vinson adopted Hand's
variation on the clear and present danger test, weighed the seriousness of
the circumstances present, and upheld convictions not just for advocacy,
but for conspiracy to advocate.33°
323. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In response to the
majority's assertion that the manifesto was an incitement, Holmes responded with
language evoking the "marketplace of ideas": "Every idea is an incitement. It offers
itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth." Id.
324. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
325. See id. at 368, 371; see also Barnum, supra note 139, at 275.
326. On this theory, see Barnum, supra note 139, at 277 ("The effect of adoption by
the Dennis Court of Hand's version of the danger test was to deprive the type of
advocacy with which the Communist Party was identified of all constitutional
protection.").
327. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion)
("To those who would paralyze our Government in the face of impending threat by
encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we must reply that all concepts are relative.").
328. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("[T]he phrase,
'clear and present danger,' is not a slogan or a shibboleth to be applied as though it
carried its own meaning; but that it involves in every case a comparison between interests
which are to be appraised qualitatively.").
329. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (noting that the facts in Gitlow,
Fiske, and De Jonge did not rise to the level of the instant case-a nation faced with "the
development of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government").
330. See id. at 511 ("It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger.").
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Justice Frankfurter similarly expressed the view that a change in
circumstances may necessitate an alteration in tests from the past.331
Justice Jackson's view with respect to the clear and present danger
standard provides an excellent example of the connections between the
perception of a novel and unique threat and the resulting conviction that
the established test is simply not an adequate response. Jackson argued
that the Communists, unlike the anarchists, did not view violence as a
means or an end in itself, but rather "the consummation of a long
process.332 As such, the tactics employed by the movement could not be
constrained by the statutes of the anarchist era and the clear and present
danger test, which would hinder the government's ability to respond to
the threat until it was too late.333 Indeed, Jackson alleged that the clear
and present danger standard even extended immunity to the early, non-
violent stages of the Communist revolution.334  As such, he
recommended saving the clear and present danger test as a "rule of
reason" for the cases it was designed for,335 and applying a more realistic
approach to the present threat, "a well-organized, nation wide
conspiracy. 336
4. Application of the Communist Era Principles
The standard for evaluating speech that advocates illegal acts or
violence has changed.337 The tests applied above have been altered or
repudiated by the Court.338 Yet, the principles derived from these cases
331. See id. at 543 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is a familiar experience in the law
that new situations do not fit neatly into legal conceptions that arose under different
circumstances to satisfy different needs.").
332. Id. at 565 (Jackson, J., concurring).
333. See id. at 567-71. Jackson argued that "[t]he authors of the clear and present
danger test never applied it to a case like this .... If applied as it is proposed here, it
means that the Communist plotting is protected during its period of incubation; its
preliminary stages of organization and preparation are immune from the law; [and] the
Government can move only after imminent action is manifest, when it would, of course,
be too late." Id. at 570.
334. See supra note 333.
335. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 568 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson's examples of
such cases are those where "the danger.., has matured by the time of trial or ... was
never present." Id.
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)
(establishing the current standard that speech can only be punished if it is directed toward
and likely to produce imminent lawless action).
338. See, e.g., id. at 449 (overruling Whitney); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
321 (1957) (distinguishing Dennis as a case concerned with a conspiracy to presently
advocate forcible action in the future, rather than a conspiracy to advocate at some future
moment); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507 (plurality opinion) (noting that opinions subsequent to
Whitney and Gitlow favored the Holmes-Brandeis standard in those cases). But see Cox,
supra note 238, at 226 (pointing out that a Brandenburg footnote seems to cite Dennis
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constitute an important lesson for advocacy cases in the future. Although
the Supreme Court eventually returned to a more measured response to
the purported threat from Communism,339 the fact remains that members
of the Court, at one time, were every bit as susceptible to anti-communist
hysteria as the rest of the Nation, and responded by allowing the
government to intensify its punishment of the language of incitement.34 °
In short, the threat of Communism in a time of peace produced anxiety in
the Court. One might reasonably assume that Justices could respond to
homegrown suicide attacks in the United States-and the resulting
national fear and anxiety-with a great degree of concern and a
willingness to uphold government restrictions on free speech.
a. Anxiety in the Terror Era
American citizens are already frequently reminded about the very
real threat of terrorism. Posters in our subways warn us to be on the
lookout for suspicious activity. 341 The major news networks bombard us
with information when terror alerts arise.342 The government advises us
to take unique and sometimes absurd protective measures. 343 Following
another attack on American soil, one can imagine a renewed response at
least as profound as that of September 2001. The fear, despondency, and
sense of danger could return, and do so reasonably. The anxiety
produced by terrorism today draws many parallels to the circumstances
"as one of the sources of the rule"); Barnum, supra note 139, at 280 (arguing that the
Brandenburg Court preserved the decision in Dennis).
339. See, e.g., Yates, 354 U.S. at 327 (acquitting a number of defendants charged
under the Smith Act); cf Barnum, supra note 139, at 278 (identifying Yates as the first
time the Supreme Court had been willing to rebuff governmental efforts to punish
advocacy of violence). Cox notes a changed Court attitude outside of advocacy cases as
well. See Cox, supra note 238, at 225 (noting that the Court struck down statutes
preventing members of the Communist Party from working in defense facilities, holding
office in labor unions, or obtaining passports).
340. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 406 ("Justices differed little from other
Americans in their attitudes toward Communism. They shared in the nation's mounting
anxiety over international crises and believed in the emerging image of domestic
Communists.").
341. See, e.g., PATH Safety Poster, http://www.panynj.gov/CommutingTravel/path/
pdfs/TPA G01 G6_050B.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
342. See, e.g., Alessandra Stanley, All Terrorism All the Time: Fear Becomes Reality
Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, at A9 (noting that coverage of terrorism has extended
from news programs to prime-time shows and even entertainment news).
343. See, e.g., Jeffrey Selingo, For Some, the Jitters Help the Bottom Line, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at G5 (noting Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge's
recommendation that Americans stock up on duct tape and plastic sheeting after a
heightened terrorist alert). While the duct tape example may seem ludicrous, the fact
remains that a fair number of Americans responded by flocking to their local hardware
stores. See Lynette Clemetson, Reshaping Message on Terror, Ridge Urges Calm With
Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at Al (noting the buying spree).
[Vol. 113:3
PRAISING THE ENEMY
and national mood surrounding the Court's decisions in Gitlow, Whitney,
and Dennis.344 As such, it is not unthinkable that the contemporary Court
might, intentionally or not, return to those opinions to counter the threat
of terrorism.
One need look no further than President Bush's descriptions of the
plague of terrorism to find a parallel to the threat of Communism
expressed in Dennis: expressions of a unique, novel threat; 345 a force
opposed to freedom;346 members controlled by foreign countries; 347 and
an international organization devoted to the destruction of democracy.
348
In the Second Circuit's Dennis opinion, Judge Learned Hand specifically
drew a comparison to the Islamic caliphate, noting that other than
Communism, "no such movement in Europe of East to West had arisen
since Islam., 349  Hand further invoked a religious lexicon to describe
Communism, arguing that the movement
has its Founder, its apostles, its sacred texts-perhaps even its
martyrs. It seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of
schooling, demanding of all an inflexible doctrinal orthodoxy. The
violent capture of all existing governments is one article of the creed
344. For an entertaining comparison of present American life to that during the Cold
War, as well as examples of the extent to which the threat of terrorism permeates our
lives, see Patricia Leigh Brown, Armageddon Again: Fear in the 50's and Now, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, § 4, at 10.
345. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting Justices Holmes and Brandeis, when they dissented in Gitlow, were not faced
with circumstances like those in Dennis), with President George W. Bush, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), supra note 223 ("[T]he civilized world faces
unprecedented dangers.").
346. Compare Dennis, 341 U.S. at 566 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting how the
Communist Party in Czechoslovakia took power, established an oppressive reign, and
denied its people certain freedoms), with President George W. Bush, Address on
Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2001, at B4 ("They hate what they see right here..., a democratically elected
government.... They hate our freedoms ... ").
347. Compare Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511 (plurality opinion) (noting the Party leaders'
ideological, at least, connection to foreign counties), and Wiecek, supra note 250, at 378
(noting the perceived connection between American Communists and Moscow), with
President George W. Bush, Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress
(Sept. 20, 2001), supra note 346 (noting the relationship between the Taliban regime of
Afghanistan and AI-Qaeda).
348. Compare Dennis, 341 U.S. at 566 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting Communist
revolution in Russia and Czechoslovakia), and Wiecek, supra note 250, at 416-17 (noting
the formation of the Communist bloc nations in Europe as a backdrop to Dennis), with
President George W. Bush, Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress
(Sept. 20, 2001), supra note 346 ("[The goal of Al Qaeda] is remaking the world and
imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere."), and id. ("They want to overthrow
existing governments in many Muslim countries ... ").
349. United States v. Dennis. 183 F.2d 201. 213 (2d Cir. 1950).
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of that faith, which abjures the possibility of success by lawful
means.
350
According to Hand, this quasi-religion had "singled out [the United
States] as the chief enemy of the faith., 351  The present Court could
easily adopt this language to describe al-Qaeda and other adherents to a
radical incarnation of Islam.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Dennis contains the prescient suggestion
that terrorism may present unique dangers, even when compared to those
perceived during the Communist era. As Douglas noted, "[t]he teaching
of methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the
pale.... 352
Ultimately, the language of the Communist era cases demonstrates
the susceptibility of the Supreme Court to the perception that a
contemporary movement constitutes a revolutionary threat to the
existence of the Nation itself. The revolutionary overthrow of the United
States government never occurred. But terrorism has struck the Nation
and presented unique challenges. Subsequent attacks would further
suggest that the threat from terrorism is at least as great as that ever
presented by Communism. Given the similarities between the two
movements, if only in the language by which they are described, the
Court could find some use of the Communist era cases to uphold
legislation such as the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act.
b. Deference to Congress
Under the principle of deference to legislative determinations of
danger, which appears in Gitlow and Whitney, the conviction of the
hypothetical imam would surely stand. The Supreme Court held in these
cases that where a legislative body determined that certain speech
presented such risk of substantive evil, such an inherently clear and
present danger that it must be punished, the use of language within that
category of speech need not be assessed under the clear and present
danger test.353 If the statute enumerates the types of speech that are
illegal, and the defendant's speech falls within that class, the speech may
be sanctioned, irrespective of the danger it does or does not pose on an
individual basis.354
350. Id. at 212.
351. Id. at213.
352. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
353. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
354. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.
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In the hypothetical at hand, like the legislatures of New York and
California in Gitlow and Whitney, Congress has determined that certain
forms of speech pose such an inherent threat to the safety and welfare of
the Nation in a time of terrorism, that their very utterance may be
punished. Section 1(3) of the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act
explicitly states that glorification falls into the category of speech likely
to be understood by members of the public as advocacy to acts of
terrorism.355 The hypothetical imam's statements proclaim perpetrators
of terrorist acts to be "praiseworthy" and "martyrs." Thus, his language
has fallen within the category of language proscribed by the statute.
Under Gitlow and Whitney, no further inquiry as to the dangerousness of
his statements is required; 35 6 Congress has determined that such language
inherently presents a substantial danger, and he may be convicted for his
speech.
The Brandenburg requirements of imminence and likelihood could
even be included in the language of the statute, which might enable the
Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act to withstand scrutiny under a version
of Brandenburg altered to include the principles of Whitney and Gitlow.
That is, if Congress explicitly found that the glorification of terrorism is
inherently likely to produce imminent terrorist acts, the Court might be
even more amenable to sustaining the Act. One might even persuasively
argue that Congress has already made this assessment, by stating in
subsection 5(b) that "[i]t is irrelevant ... whether any person is in fact
encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare, or instigate"
an act of terrorism. 357 Such language might be cited in support of the
argument that Congress deems glorification intrinsically likely to
produce imminent terrorist conduct.
While the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act (and the Terrorism
Act 2006, for that matter) includes a mens rea requirement absent from
355. See supra Part II.E. 1.; see also Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, pt. 1, § 1(3) (Eng.).
356. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670. The hypothetical imam
might raise the defense that for language to truly fall within the category of speech
proscribed by the statute, not only must it glorify, but it must be such that members of the
public could reasonably be expected to infer that it is a call to emulation. See
Hypothetical Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act, § l(2)(b), supra Part II.E. 1. However,
his second statement links the actions of the "martyrs" to the ongoing military presence in
Iraq and Afghanistan, suggesting that the former will continue to occur until the latter is
ended. A court could construe this as fulfilling section l(2)(b). That is, members of the
public could reasonably be expected to infer that the acclamation invites them to take
action in the existing circumstances-specifically, in light of the continuing military
presence.
357. See Hypothetical Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act § 1(5)(b), supra Part
II.E. 1.
2009]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
the statutes in Gitlow and Whitney,358 Whitney nevertheless provides an
important lesson for the radical imam. In Whitney, the Court rejected the
protests of the defendant that she had not intended and could not foresee
the radical tack the California Communist Labour Party would take.359
The Court reasoned that her participation in the organization belied this
objection.360 Similar objections from the imam, averring that he could
not foresee that members of the audience would take his message of
glorification to heart and act upon it, might also be rejected by the
Court-he made the speech, and that is enough. The Court may
similarly cast his argument aside on the basis of the fact that the Anti-
Glorification of Terrorism Act also penalizes statements made
recklessly.
361
Whitney has been expressly overruled by Brandenburg.362 Still, the
principle of deference to legislative determinations that certain language
constitutes an inherent threat in the face of grave peril may be of some
use to Justices following another attack within America.
c. Alterations to Existing Standards-Moving Past Brandenburg
The shifting tests for determining when advocacy presents danger,
as seen in the Communist era, 363 suggest that Brandenburg is not
permanent. The Government could argue at trial that the Brandenburg
decision involved a threat far less dire than Communism, at least so far
as the government perceived Communism in the first half of the
twentieth century.364 The opinion expresses none of the profound
concerns or anxieties present in Gitlow, Whitney, and Dennis with
respect to Communism-namely, no reference to similar statutes in other
358. See Terrorism Act § 1(2)(b); Hypothetical Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act
§ l(2)(b), supra Part II.E.1; see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360 (reproducing the pertinent
text of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 654-55 (reproducing
the pertinent text of New York's criminal anarchy statute).
359. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 367.
360. See id. at 367-68.
361. See Hypothetical Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act, supra Part II.E.I.
362. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
363. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
364. Cf Wiecek, supra note 250, at 406. Wiecek states that "[a] majority of Justices
regarded Communists and their Party as ... different from other radical groups like the
Klan, uniquely threatening to America's national security." Id. As such, the Court
assigned adherents to Communism, "a special status under the Constitution," id., and
permitted Congress greater power to restrict their freedom. Id. at 377. See also Cox,
supra note 238, at 225 ("[Olne seeking to foretell the course of decisions cannot wholly
forget that it was easier to write brave words defending speech in 1969 than in time of
war."). Cf Lasson, supra note 5, at 74 (arguing that Brandenburg could be used to
regulate hate speech and incitement coming from mosques, since "[tierrorism creates a
kind of permanent imminence.").
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states to demonstrate the need,365 no definitions of the Klan as "an
apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government," 366 no description of the issue as a conflict of interests
beyond the pale of the ordinary case,367 and no suggestion that the threat
posed by the Klan cannot be constrained through existing jurisprudence
or law. 368  Implicit in the Brandenburg opinion is the notion that the
threat posed by the Klan was not significant enough to justify punishing
its members for advocacy.369 Implicit in the Dennis opinion is the notion
that the threat posed by Communism cannot be constrained.37 °
Given these differing circumstances, the Supreme Court could
decide that Brandenburg is a more apt test for a time of peace, or for
times where no entity threatens the destruction of the United States.371
The Court could find that terrorism has turned the Nation into a
battlefront, that violent terrorist groups imperil the economy, functioning
government, and daily existence itself. It could rule that the government
needs greater powers to contend with a threat of a magnitude never
encountered in the Nation's history. With such a finding, the Court
could look to the cases arising in the era of Communism as guidance in a
time of terror, anxiety, and enemies within the Nation itself. It could
determine that cases such as Gitlow, Whitney, and Dennis, and the tests
for speech therein, provide a better solution-albeit a temporary one-
than the test propounded in Brandenburg.37 2 Under these tests, the Court
365. Cf, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 370-71.
366. Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion).
367. Cf id. at 518-19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
368. Cf id. at 567, 578 (Jackson, J., concurring).
369. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
370. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
371. Cf Dennis, 341 U.S. at 568 (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing for the clear and
present danger test, the contemporary standard for advocacy, as a rule of reason under
other circumstances, but for a different approach to combat the threat posed by
Communism).
372. In fact, the Brandenburg decision seems to preserve-and perhaps even
endorse-Dennis. Archibald Cox observed that a footnote in Brandenburg suggests that
Dennis is the source of the Brandenburg test for advocacy. See Cox, supra note 238, at
226. The footnote immediately follows the Brandenburg Court's announcement of the
new test and states that "[i]t was on the theory that the Smith Act embodied such a
principle [i.e., the Brandenburg imminent and likely test] and that it had been applied
only in conformity with it that this Court sustained the Act's constitutionality." See
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 n.2 (internal citations omitted) (citing Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). I would add that the Brandenburg decision also appears to
refer to Dennis as one of the "later decisions" from which the Brandenburg rule was
derived. The text immediately preceding the Court's announcement of the Brandenburg
rule reads: "But Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 507 (1951). These later decisions have fashioned the
principle .. " Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. Whatever the Court intended by citing
Dennis in this manner, its presence in the Brandenburg decision creates a judicial
loophole that could permit a future Court to return to Dennis without much difficulty. As
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would very likely affirm the hypothetical imam's conviction and uphold
the Anti-Glorification of Terrorism Act.
V. CONCLUSION
As a response to the July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks in London, the
United Kingdom enacted the Terrorism Act 2006. Section 1 of that Act,
sanctioning the glorification of acts of terror, constitutes a far-reaching
attempt to curb incitement to commit terrorist acts. Whether or not the
Act will truly silence the preachers of hate, whose words may have
influenced the suicide bombers, remains to be seen. Whether the British
government will successfully use the Act to prosecute radical preachers
like Abu Izzadeen remains unclear. Whether use of the Act will lead to
greater extremism by Muslim youth who feel victimized by one-sided
application must be assessed.373
For better or for worse, the Supreme Court's decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio presents an imposing obstacle to similar legislation
in the United States. To avoid running afoul of current First Amendment
jurisprudence, Congress would have to carefully craft a statute that made
the proper distinction between "the mere abstract teaching" of the tenets
of terror, and language "steeling" a listener to action. 374 Any speech that
fell short of the Brandenburg test could not be punished.
And yet, the history of the speech of advocacy to violence
demonstrates that there are times when the Supreme Court has ranked
First Amendment guarantees secondary in importance to concerns for the
Nation's safety. During the First World War, the danger presented by
those whose speech might prove injurious to the war effort justified the
375punishment of advocacy. During the Communist era, the specter of a
vast, international organization, poised to destroy American democracy
justified the curtailment of inciting speech.376
Cox notes of the inconsistency in the footnote, "[iln a time of apparent crisis, ambiguity
coupled with the citation [to Dennis] might make it all too easy to write an opinion
reviving the Dennis version of the 'clear and present danger' test." Cox, supra note 238,
at 226. It is important to note, however, that while the Brandenburg majority appeared to
view Dennis as positive precedent, the concurring Justices expressly denied the
continuing validity of Dennis. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 450 (Black, J., concurring)
(understanding the majority's opinion as citing Dennis, but not indicating any agreement
"with the 'clear and present danger' doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely"); id. at
454 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for
any 'clear and present danger' test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or
free-wheeling as the Court in Dennis rephrased it.").
373. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
374. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
297-98 (1961)).
375. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
376. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (plurality opinion).
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With this precedent before it, the Supreme Court could determine
that the threat from terrorism is far too novel, far too difficult to stop, and
far too deadly to be dealt with under the normal rules. Applying the
lessons of the cases from World War I and the Communist eras, the
Court might find reason to support the punishment of speech that
glorifies terrorists or their acts.
The Court could uphold an act similar to Britain's Terrorism Act
2006; the inevitable question, however, is should it? The answer, I
believe, is an unequivocal "no." The idea that certain actions "let the
terrorists win" has been bandied about in the United States since
September 11, 2001. Surely there is no clearer example of relenting to
the desires of al-Qaeda and other organizations, of succumbing to the
pressures presented by terrorists worldwide, than the curtailing of the
liberties that our Nation is founded upon. Free speech can survive
without the United States, but the United States cannot survive without
free speech. On the surface and in name, the Nation might remain very
much the same in an era in which the glorification of terrorists is
punished, but our ideals will have been trumped by fear, and the promise
of the Nation will be greatly reduced.
The cases presented in this Comment should to serve more as a
reminder of how the government, the public, and the Court have
occasionally diverted from the path of freedom rather than as tools the
Court might use to support future detours from the American ideal. As
H.L. Mencken noted, while reflecting upon the ebb and flow of the First
Amendment's guarantees during his life, "[w]ar, in this country, wipes
out all the rules of fair play, even those prevailing among wild
animals., 377 History may provide examples of times when the Court has
been complicit in such an attitude, when it has allowed national hysteria
to trump settled values-if not settled law-but this is no excuse to make
the same mistake in the current conflict, or in those we may face in the
future. There will be wars and threats to national integrity in the future,
dangers that test the wisdom of guaranteeing freedom of speech. But
without that freedom, without the guarantee of the First Amendment,
there will not truly be a United States.
377. H.L. MENCKEN, THE DIARY OF H.L. MENCKEN 376 (Charles A. Fecher ed.,
1989).
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